In reality, the Chinese both venerate and fear water: after all, theirs is a land of drought and flooding. It was for this reason that the Middle Empire deified Li Bing, in 250 BC the governor of what is now Sichuan province, and a hydraulics genius who built the first dam on the Minjiang River, a tributary of the Yangtze. He devised a network of canals: open canals for irrigation, closed canals for flood control. Li Bing placed three male statues in the river as a means of monitoring its waters. If the feet of the statues were visible, it meant drought and so the sluice-gates on the dam were opened. If their shoulders were covered in water, flooding threatened and the sluicegates were closed. From that time on, the Chinese made constant progress in water management, introducing sophisticated networks of bamboo pipes to irrigate the fields and bring water into the cities, as early as 1089 in Hangzhou and 1096 in Guangdong. In ancient China, the central authority was divided into six ministries and the Xingbu was responsible for public works, building and water. The Chinese even built hydraulic clocks reproducing the movement of the “three luminaries” – the sun, the moon and certain stars- which were of great importance in drawing up the calendar and in astrological divination(102), two major attributes exclusive to the imperial power. The Arabs were later to excel at building clocks of this kind103 and the gift of such a clock to the Emperor Charlemagne by the Caliph Haroun el Rachid dazzled the Frankish court around 800 AD.

The Chinese were also grateful to water for enabling them to discover… salt. This essential substance was discovered in 6000 BC at Lake Yuncheng(104) and Chinese tradition maintains thatwater, salt and soya are sufficient to the sage to sustain life.

Water and mountains are fundamental to an understanding of Chinese civilisation, its culture, beliefs, painting, philosophy, lifestyle and warlike exploits(105)… Chinese painting, for example, depicts “Celestial Mountains”, which in fact is nothing other than “a quest for the sacred between shan (mountain) and shui (water), a meditation on the human condition between nature and the divine, between poet and painter, between Heaven and Earth”.
hus Lan Ying, in the Ming period (1368 – 1644), painted an album whose every page shows gently flowing streams, metaphorical paintings expressing the artist’s belief that man living in society must remain serene and let his existence flow as smoothly as the water that runs in the river.

The culture of the sage in China developed over the years as “an awareness of the spiritual dimension of mountain and water, and of nature in general.” Applying the principle of Guandao, the sage seeks to “develop a philosophy of life akin to the law of water which flows silently, naturally, without ever turning back(106) “.

In today’s China, certain considerations devoid of any spirituality have come to the fore. When asked why the shrine in the family courtyard was no longer tended, one peasant farmer replied, “We used to pray for rain, but now we have irrigation(107)”.

This view must be qualified, however, since France’s “Year of China” taught us, for example, that in Chongwu (Fujian province) all the schools organise a weekly gathering on the shore of the China Sea -perceived as a strong and binding link between the Chinese people- to pay homage to nature and to instil respect into the unconscious of young people. Similarly, in Yunnan, Hani sorcerers still gather today to allocate water equitably between the rice paddies.

Another example is the opposition to the Three Gorges Dam, which has its strongest roots in the fact that the waters created by the giant dam will submerge cemeteries and thus prevent the celebration of ancestor worship.

The situation calls to mind what Jacques Berque had to say of the construction of the Suez Canal: “Technology is far from being ontologically neutral.We now know that, contrary to the assumptions of the positivists, far from eliminating metaphysical questionings, it both provokes and shapes them(108)”.
http://www.institut.veolia.org

His two previous lama “incarnations” were then retroactively recognized as his predecessors, thereby transforming the 1st Dalai Lama into the 3rd Dalai Lama. This 1st (or 3rd) Dalai Lama seized monasteries that did not belong to his sect, and is believed to have destroyed Buddhist writings that conflicted with his claim to divinity. The Dalai Lama who succeeded him pursued a sybaritic life, enjoying many mistresses, partying with friends, and acting in other ways deemed unfitting for an incarnate deity. For these transgressions he was murdered by his priests. Within 170 years, despite their recognized divine status, five Dalai Lamas were killed by their high priests or other courtiers. 6

For hundreds of years competing Tibetan Buddhist sects engaged in bitterly violent clashes and summary executions. In 1660, the 5th Dalai Lama was faced with a rebellion in Tsang province, the stronghold of the rival Kagyu sect with its high lama known as the Karmapa. The 5th Dalai Lama called for harsh retribution against the rebels, directing the Mongol army to obliterate the male and female lines, and the offspring too “like eggs smashed against rocks…. In short, annihilate any traces of them, even their names.” 7

In 1792, many Kagyu monasteries were confiscated and their monks were forcibly converted to the Gelug sect (the Dalai Lama’s denomination). The Gelug school, known also as the “Yellow Hats,” showed little tolerance or willingness to mix their teachings with other Buddhist sects. In the words of one of their traditional prayers: “Praise to you, violent god of the Yellow Hat teachings/who reduces to particles of dust/ great beings, high officials and ordinary people/ who pollute and corrupt the Gelug doctrine.” 8 An eighteenth-century memoir of a Tibetan general depicts sectarian strife among Buddhists that is as brutal and bloody as any religious conflict might be. 9 This grim history remains largely unvisited by present-day followers of Tibetan Buddhism in the West.

Religions have had a close relationship not only with violence but with economic exploitation. Indeed, it is often the economic exploitation that necessitates the violence. Such was the case with the Tibetan theocracy. Until 1959, when the Dalai Lama last presided over Tibet, most of the arable land was still organized into manorial estates worked by serfs. These estates were owned by two social groups: the rich secular landlords and the rich theocratic lamas. Even a writer sympathetic to the old order allows that “a great deal of real estate belonged to the monasteries, and most of them amassed great riches.” Much of the wealth was accumulated “through active participation in trade, commerce, and money lending.” 10

Drepung monastery was one of the biggest landowners in the world, with its 185 manors, 25,000 serfs, 300 great pastures, and 16,000 herdsmen. The wealth of the monasteries rested in the hands of small numbers of high-ranking lamas. Most ordinary monks lived modestly and had no direct access to great wealth. The Dalai Lama himself “lived richly in the 1000-room, 14-story Potala Palace.” 11

Secular leaders also did well. A notable example was the commander-in-chief of the Tibetan army, a member of the Dalai Lama’s lay Cabinet, who owned 4,000 square kilometers of land and 3,500 serfs. 12 Old Tibet has been misrepresented by some Western admirers as “a nation that required no police force because its people voluntarily observed the laws of karma.” 13 In fact. it had a professional army, albeit a small one, that served mainly as a gendarmerie for the landlords to keep order, protect their property, and hunt down runaway serfs.

Young Tibetan boys were regularly taken from their peasant families and brought into the monasteries to be trained as monks. Once there, they were bonded for life. Tashì-Tsering, a monk, reports that it was common for peasant children to be sexually mistreated in the monasteries. He himself was a victim of repeated rape, beginning at age nine. 14 The monastic estates also conscripted children for lifelong servitude as domestics, dance performers, and soldiers.

In old Tibet there were small numbers of farmers who subsisted as a kind of free peasantry, and perhaps an additional 10,000 people who composed the “middle-class” families of merchants, shopkeepers, and small traders. Thousands of others were beggars. There also were slaves, usually domestic servants, who owned nothing. Their offspring were born into slavery. 15 The majority of the rural population were serfs. Treated little better than slaves, the serfs went without schooling or medical care, They were under a lifetime bond to work the lord’s land–or the monastery’s land–without pay, to repair the lord’s houses, transport his crops, and collect his firewood. They were also expected to provide carrying animals and transportation on demand.16 Their masters told them what crops to grow and what animals to raise. They could not get married without the consent of their lord or lama. And they might easily be separated from their families should their owners lease them out to work in a distant location. 17

As in a free labor system and unlike slavery, the overlords had no responsibility for the serf’s maintenance and no direct interest in his or her survival as an expensive piece of property. The serfs had to support themselves. Yet as in a slave system, they were bound to their masters, guaranteeing a fixed and permanent workforce that could neither organize nor strike nor freely depart as might laborers in a market context. The overlords had the best of both worlds.

One 22-year old woman, herself a runaway serf, reports: “Pretty serf girls were usually taken by the owner as house servants and used as he wished”; they “were just slaves without rights.”18 Serfs needed permission to go anywhere. Landowners had legal authority to capture those who tried to flee. One 24-year old runaway welcomed the Chinese intervention as a “liberation.” He testified that under serfdom he was subjected to incessant toil, hunger, and cold. After his third failed escape, he was merciless beaten by the landlord’s men until blood poured from his nose and mouth. They then poured alcohol and caustic soda on his wounds to increase the pain, he claimed.19

The serfs were taxed upon getting married, taxed for the birth of each child and for every death in the family. They were taxed for planting a tree in their yard and for keeping animals. They were taxed for religious festivals and for public dancing and drumming, for being sent to prison and upon being released. Those who could not find work were taxed for being unemployed, and if they traveled to another village in search of work, they paid a passage tax. When people could not pay, the monasteries lent them money at 20 to 50 percent interest. Some debts were handed down from father to son to grandson. Debtors who could not meet their obligations risked being cast into slavery.20

The theocracy’s religious teachings buttressed its class order. The poor and afflicted were taught that they had brought their troubles upon themselves because of their wicked ways in previous lives. Hence they had to accept the misery of their present existence as a karmic atonement and in anticipation that their lot would improve in their next lifetime. The rich and powerful treated their good fortune as a reward for, and tangible evidence of, virtue in past and present lives.

The Tibetan serfs were something more than superstitious victims, blind to their own oppression. As we have seen, some ran away; others openly resisted, sometimes suffering dire consequences. In feudal Tibet, torture and mutilation–including eye gouging, the pulling out of tongues, hamstringing, and amputation–were favored punishments inflicted upon thieves, and runaway or resistant serfs. Journeying through Tibet in the 1960s, Stuart and Roma Gelder interviewed a former serf, Tsereh Wang Tuei, who had stolen two sheep belonging to a monastery. For this he had both his eyes gouged out and his hand mutilated beyond use. He explains that he no longer is a Buddhist: “When a holy lama told them to blind me I thought there was no good in religion.”21 Since it was against Buddhist teachings to take human life, some offenders were severely lashed and then “left to God” in the freezing night to die. “The parallels between Tibet and medieval Europe are striking,” concludes Tom Grunfeld in his book on Tibet. 22

In 1959, Anna Louise Strong visited an exhibition of torture equipment that had been used by the Tibetan overlords. There were handcuffs of all sizes, including small ones for children, and instruments for cutting off noses and ears, gouging out eyes, breaking off hands, and hamstringing legs. There were hot brands, whips, and special implements for disemboweling. The exhibition presented photographs and testimonies of victims who had been blinded or crippled or suffered amputations for thievery. There was the shepherd whose master owed him a reimbursement in yuan and wheat but refused to pay. So he took one of the master’s cows; for this he had his hands severed. Another herdsman, who opposed having his wife taken from him by his lord, had his hands broken off. There were pictures of Communist activists with noses and upper lips cut off, and a woman who was raped and then had her nose sliced away.23

Earlier visitors to Tibet commented on the theocratic despotism. In 1895, an Englishman, Dr. A. L. Waddell, wrote that the populace was under the “intolerable tyranny of monks” and the devil superstitions they had fashioned to terrorize the people. In 1904 Perceval Landon described the Dalai Lama’s rule as “an engine of oppression.” At about that time, another English traveler, Captain W.F.T. O’Connor, observed that “the great landowners and the priests… exercise each in their own dominion a despotic power from which there is no appeal,” while the people are “oppressed by the most monstrous growth of monasticism and priest-craft.” Tibetan rulers “invented degrading legends and stimulated a spirit of superstition” among the common people. In 1937, another visitor, Spencer Chapman, wrote, “The Lamaist monk does not spend his time in ministering to the people or educating them. . . . The beggar beside the road is nothing to the monk. Knowledge is the jealously guarded prerogative of the monasteries and is used to increase their influence and wealth.”24 As much as we might wish otherwise, feudal theocratic Tibet was a far cry from the romanticized Shangri La so enthusiastically nurtured by Buddhism’s western proselytes.

II. Secularization vs. Spirituality

What happened to Tibet after the Chinese Communists moved into the country in 1951? The treaty of that year provided for ostensible self-governance under the Dalai Lama’s rule but gave China military control and exclusive right to conduct foreign relations. The Chinese were also granted a direct role in internal administration “to promote social reforms.” Among the earliest changes they wrought was to reduce usurious interest rates, and build a few hospitals and roads. At first, they moved slowly, relying mostly on persuasion in an attempt to effect reconstruction. No aristocratic or monastic property was confiscated, and feudal lords continued to reign over their hereditarily bound peasants. “Contrary to popular belief in the West,” claims one observer, the Chinese “took care to show respect for Tibetan culture and religion.”25

Over the centuries the Tibetan lords and lamas had seen Chinese come and go, and had enjoyed good relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek and his reactionary Kuomintang rule in China.26 The approval of the Kuomintang government was needed to validate the choice of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. When the current 14th Dalai Lama was first installed in Lhasa, it was with an armed escort of Chinese troops and an attending Chinese minister, in accordance with centuries-old tradition. What upset the Tibetan lords and lamas in the early 1950s was that these latest Chinese were Communists. It would be only a matter of time, they feared, before the Communists started imposing their collectivist egalitarian schemes upon Tibet.

The issue was joined in 1956-57, when armed Tibetan bands ambushed convoys of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. The uprising received extensive assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including military training, support camps in Nepal, and numerous airlifts.27 Meanwhile in the United States, the American Society for a Free Asia, a CIA-financed front, energetically publicized the cause of Tibetan resistance, with the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Thubtan Norbu, playing an active role in that organization. The Dalai Lama’s second-eldest brother, Gyalo Thondup, established an intelligence operation with the CIA as early as 1951. He later upgraded it into a CIA-trained guerrilla unit whose recruits parachuted back into Tibet.28

Many Tibetan commandos and agents whom the CIA dropped into the country were chiefs of aristocratic clans or the sons of chiefs. Ninety percent of them were never heard from again, according to a report from the CIA itself, meaning they were most likely captured and killed.29 “Many lamas and lay members of the elite and much of the Tibetan army joined the uprising, but in the main the populace did not, assuring its failure,” writes Hugh Deane.30 In their book on Tibet, Ginsburg and Mathos reach a similar conclusion: “As far as can be ascertained, the great bulk of the common people of Lhasa and of the adjoining countryside failed to join in the fighting against the Chinese both when it first began and as it progressed.”31 Eventually the resistance crumbled.

Whatever wrongs and new oppressions introduced by the Chinese after 1959, they did abolish slavery and the Tibetan serfdom system of unpaid labor. They eliminated the many crushing taxes, started work projects, and greatly reduced unemployment and beggary. They established secular schools, thereby breaking the educational monopoly of the monasteries. And they constructed running water and electrical systems in Lhasa.32

Heinrich Harrer (later revealed to have been a sergeant in Hitler’s SS) wrote a bestseller about his experiences in Tibet that was made into a popular Hollywood movie. He reported that the Tibetans who resisted the Chinese “were predominantly nobles, semi-nobles and lamas; they were punished by being made to perform the lowliest tasks, such as laboring on roads and bridges. They were further humiliated by being made to clean up the city before the tourists arrived.” They also had to live in a camp originally reserved for beggars and vagrants–all of which Harrer treats as sure evidence of the dreadful nature of the Chinese occupation.33

By 1961, Chinese occupation authorities expropriated the landed estates owned by lords and lamas. They distributed many thousands of acres to tenant farmers and landless peasants, reorganizing them into hundreds of communes.. Herds once owned by nobility were turned over to collectives of poor shepherds. Improvements were made in the breeding of livestock, and new varieties of vegetables and new strains of wheat and barley were introduced, along with irrigation improvements, all of which reportedly led to an increase in agrarian production.34

Many peasants remained as religious as ever, giving alms to the clergy. But monks who had been conscripted as children into the religious orders were now free to renounce the monastic life, and thousands did, especially the younger ones. The remaining clergy lived on modest government stipends and extra income earned by officiating at prayer services, weddings, and funerals.35

Both the Dalai Lama and his advisor and youngest brother, Tendzin Choegyal, claimed that “more than 1.2 million Tibetans are dead as a result of the Chinese occupation.”36 The official 1953 census–six years before the Chinese crackdown–recorded the entire population residing in Tibet at 1,274,000.37 Other census counts put the population within Tibet at about two million. If the Chinese killed 1.2 million in the early 1960s then almost all of Tibet, would have been depopulated, transformed into a killing field dotted with death camps and mass graves–of which we have no evidence. The thinly distributed Chinese force in Tibet could not have rounded up, hunted down, and exterminated that many people even if it had spent all its time doing nothing else.

Chinese authorities claim to have put an end to floggings, mutilations, and amputations as a form of criminal punishment. They themselves, however, have been charged with acts of brutality by exile Tibetans. The authorities do admit to “mistakes,” particularly during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution when the persecution of religious beliefs reached a high tide in both China and Tibet. After the uprising in the late 1950s, thousands of Tibetans were incarcerated. During the Great Leap Forward, forced collectivization and grain farming were imposed on the Tibetan peasantry, sometimes with disastrous effect on production. In the late 1970s, China began relaxing controls “and tried to undo some of the damage wrought during the previous two decades.”38

In 1980, the Chinese government initiated reforms reportedly designed to grant Tibet a greater degree of self-rule and self-administration. Tibetans would now be allowed to cultivate private plots, sell their harvest surpluses, decide for themselves what crops to grow, and keep yaks and sheep. Communication with the outside world was again permitted, and frontier controls were eased to permit some Tibetans to visit exiled relatives in India and Nepal.39 By the 1980s many of the principal lamas had begun to shuttle back and forth between China and the exile communities abroad, “restoring their monasteries in Tibet and helping to revitalize Buddhism there.”40

As of 2007 Tibetan Buddhism was still practiced widely and tolerated by officialdom. Religious pilgrimages and other standard forms of worship were allowed but within limits. All monks and nuns had to sign a loyalty pledge that they would not use their religious position to foment secession or dissent. And displaying photos of the Dalai Lama was declared illegal.41

In the 1990s, the Han, the ethnic group comprising over 95 percent of China’s immense population, began moving in substantial numbers into Tibet. On the streets of Lhasa and Shigatse, signs of Han colonization are readily visible. Chinese run the factories and many of the shops and vending stalls. Tall office buildings and large shopping centers have been built with funds that might have been better spent on water treatment plants and housing. Chinese cadres in Tibet too often view their Tibetan neighbors as backward and lazy, in need of economic development and “patriotic education.” During the 1990s Tibetan government employees suspected of harboring nationalist sympathies were purged from office, and campaigns were once again launched to discredit the Dalai Lama. Individual Tibetans reportedly were subjected to arrest, imprisonment, and forced labor for carrying out separatist activities and engaging in “political subversion.” Some were held in administrative detention without adequate food, water, and blankets, subjected to threats, beatings, and other mistreatment.42

Tibetan history, culture, and certainly religion are slighted in schools. Teaching materials, though translated into Tibetan, focus mainly on Chinese history and culture. Chinese family planning regulations allow a three-child limit for Tibetan families. (There is only a one-child limit for Han families throughout China, and a two-child limit for rural Han families whose first child is a girl.) If a Tibetan couple goes over the three-child limit, the excess children can be denied subsidized daycare, health care, housing, and education. These penalties have been enforced irregularly and vary by district.43 None of these child services, it should be noted, were available to Tibetans before the Chinese takeover.

For the rich lamas and secular lords, the Communist intervention was an unmitigated calamity. Most of them fled abroad, as did the Dalai Lama himself, who was assisted in his flight by the CIA. Some discovered to their horror that they would have to work for a living. Many, however, escaped that fate. Throughout the 1960s, the Tibetan exile community was secretly pocketing $1.7 million a year from the CIA, according to documents released by the State Department in 1998. Once this fact was publicized, the Dalai Lama’s organization itself issued a statement admitting that it had received millions of dollars from the CIA during the 1960s to send armed squads of exiles into Tibet to undermine the Maoist revolution. The Dalai Lama’s annual payment from the CIA was $186,000. Indian intelligence also financed both him and other Tibetan exiles. He has refused to say whether he or his brothers worked for the CIA. The agency has also declined to comment.44

In 1995, the News & Observer of Raleigh, North Carolina, carried a frontpage color photograph of the Dalai Lama being embraced by the reactionary Republican senator Jesse Helms, under the headline “Buddhist Captivates Hero of Religious Right.”45 In April 1999, along with Margaret Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, and the first George Bush, the Dalai Lama called upon the British government to release Augusto Pinochet, the former fascist dictator of Chile and a longtime CIA client who was visiting England. The Dalai Lama urged that Pinochet not be forced to go to Spain where he was wanted to stand trial for crimes against humanity.

Into the twenty-first century, via the National Endowment for Democracy and other conduits that are more respectable sounding than the CIA, the U.S. Congress continued to allocate an annual $2 million to Tibetans in India, with additional millions for “democracy activities” within the Tibetan exile community. In addition to these funds, the Dalai Lama received money from financier George Soros.46

Whatever the Dalai Lama’s associations with the CIA and various reactionaries, he did speak often of peace, love, and nonviolence. He himself really cannot be blamed for the abuses of Tibet’s ancien régime, having been but 25 years old when he fled into exile. In a 1994 interview, he went on record as favoring the building of schools and roads in his country. He said the corvée (forced unpaid serf labor) and certain taxes imposed on the peasants were “extremely bad.” And he disliked the way people were saddled with old debts sometimes passed down from generation to generation.47During the half century of living in the western world, he had embraced concepts such as human rights and religious freedom, ideas largely unknown in old Tibet. He even proposed democracy for Tibet, featuring a written constitution and a representative assembly.48

In 1996, the Dalai Lama issued a statement that must have had an unsettling effect on the exile community. It read in part: “Marxism is founded on moral principles, while capitalism is concerned only with gain and profitability.” Marxism fosters “the equitable utilization of the means of production” and cares about “the fate of the working classes” and “the victims of . . . exploitation. For those reasons the system appeals to me, and . . . I think of myself as half-Marxist, half-Buddhist.49

But he also sent a reassuring message to “those who live in abundance”: “It is a good thing to be rich… Those are the fruits for deserving actions, the proof that they have been generous in the past.” And to the poor he offers this admonition: “There is no good reason to become bitter and rebel against those who have property and fortune… It is better to develop a positive attitude.”50

In 2005 the Dalai Lama signed a widely advertised statement along with ten other Nobel Laureates supporting the “inalienable and fundamental human right” of working people throughout the world to form labor unions to protect their interests, in accordance with the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In many countries “this fundamental right is poorly protected and in some it is explicitly banned or brutally suppressed,” the statement read. Burma, China, Colombia, Bosnia, and a few other countries were singled out as among the worst offenders. Even the United States “fails to adequately protect workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively. Millions of U.S. workers lack any legal protection to form unions….”51

The Dalai Lama also gave full support to removing the ingrained traditional obstacles that have kept Tibetan nuns from receiving an education. Upon arriving in exile, few nuns could read or write. In Tibet their activities had been devoted to daylong periods of prayer and chants. But in northern India they now began reading Buddhist philosophy and engaging in theological study and debate, activities that in old Tibet had been open only to monks.52

In November 2005 the Dalai Lama spoke at Stanford University on “The Heart of Nonviolence,” but stopped short of a blanket condemnation of all violence. Violent actions that are committed in order to reduce future suffering are not to be condemned, he said, citing World War II as an example of a worthy effort to protect democracy. What of the four years of carnage and mass destruction in Iraq, a war condemned by most of the world—even by a conservative pope–as a blatant violation of international law and a crime against humanity? The Dalai Lama was undecided: “The Iraq war—it’s too early to say, right or wrong.”53 Earlier he had voiced support for the U.S. military intervention against Yugoslavia and, later on, the U.S. military intervention into Afghanistan.54

III. Exit Feudal Theocracy

As the Shangri-La myth would have it, in old Tibet the people lived in contented and tranquil symbiosis with their monastic and secular lords. Rich lamas and poor monks, wealthy landlords and impoverished serfs were all bonded together, mutually sustained by the comforting balm of a deeply spiritual and pacific culture.

One is reminded of the idealized image of feudal Europe presented by latter-day conservative Catholics such as G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. For them, medieval Christendom was a world of contented peasants living in the secure embrace of their Church, under the more or less benign protection of their lords.55 Again we are invited to accept a particular culture in its idealized form divorced from its murky material history. This means accepting it as presented by its favored class, by those who profited most from it. The Shangri-La image of Tibet bears no more resemblance to historic actuality than does the pastoral image of medieval Europe.

Seen in all its grim realities, old Tibet confirms the view I expressed in an earlier book, namely that culture is anything but neutral. Culture can operate as a legitimating cover for a host of grave injustices, benefiting a privileged portion of society at great cost to the rest.56 In theocratic feudal Tibet, ruling interests manipulated the traditional culture to fortify their own wealth and power. The theocracy equated rebellious thought and action with satanic influence. It propagated the general presumption of landlord superiority and peasant unworthiness. The rich were represented as deserving their good life, and the lowly poor as deserving their mean existence, all codified in teachings about the karmic residue of virtue and vice accumulated from past lives, presented as part of God’s will.

Were the more affluent lamas just hypocrites who preached one thing and secretly believed another? More likely they were genuinely attached to those beliefs that brought such good results for them. That their theology so perfectly supported their material privileges only strengthened the sincerity with which it was embraced.

It might be said that we denizens of the modern secular world cannot grasp the equations of happiness and pain, contentment and custom, that characterize more traditionally spiritual societies. This is probably true, and it may explain why some of us idealize such societies. But still, a gouged eye is a gouged eye; a flogging is a flogging; and the grinding exploitation of serfs and slaves is a brutal class injustice whatever its cultural wrapping. There is a difference between a spiritual bond and human bondage, even when both exist side by side

Many ordinary Tibetans want the Dalai Lama back in their country, but it appears that relatively few want a return to the social order he represented. A 1999 story in the Washington Post notes that the Dalai Lama continues to be revered in Tibet, but

. . . few Tibetans would welcome a return of the corrupt aristocratic clans that fled with him in 1959 and that comprise the bulk of his advisers. Many Tibetan farmers, for example, have no interest in surrendering the land they gained during China’s land reform to the clans. Tibet’s former slaves say they, too, don’t want their former masters to return to power. “I’ve already lived that life once before,” said Wangchuk, a 67-year-old former slave who was wearing his best clothes for his yearly pilgrimage to Shigatse, one of the holiest sites of Tibetan Buddhism. He said he worshipped the Dalai Lama, but added, “I may not be free under Chinese communism, but I am better off than when I was a slave.”57

It should be noted that the Dalai Lama is not the only highly placed lama chosen in childhood as a reincarnation. One or another reincarnate lama or tulku–a spiritual teacher of special purity elected to be reborn again and again–can be found presiding over most major monasteries. The tulku system is unique to Tibetan Buddhism. Scores of Tibetan lamas claim to be reincarnate tulkus.

The very first tulku was a lama known as the Karmapa who appeared nearly three centuries before the first Dalai Lama. The Karmapa is leader of a Tibetan Buddhist tradition known as the Karma Kagyu. The rise of the Gelugpa sect headed by the Dalai Lama led to a politico-religious rivalry with the Kagyu that has lasted five hundred years and continues to play itself out within the Tibetan exile community today. That the Kagyu sect has grown famously, opening some six hundred new centers around the world in the last thirty-five years, has not helped the situation.

The search for a tulku, Erik Curren reminds us, has not always been conducted in that purely spiritual mode portrayed in certain Hollywood films. “Sometimes monastic officials wanted a child from a powerful local noble family to give the cloister more political clout. Other times they wanted a child from a lower-class family who would have little leverage to influence the child’s upbringing.” On other occasions “a local warlord, the Chinese emperor or even the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa might [have tried] to impose its choice of tulku on a monastery for political reasons.”58

Such may have been the case in the selection of the 17th Karmapa, whose monastery-in-exile is situated in Rumtek, in the Indian state of Sikkim. In 1993 the monks of the Karma Kagyu tradition had a candidate of their own choice. The Dalai Lama, along with several dissenting Karma Kagyu leaders (and with the support of the Chinese government!) backed a different boy. The Kagyu monks charged that the Dalai Lama had overstepped his authority in attempting to select a leader for their sect. “Neither his political role nor his position as a lama in his own Gelugpa tradition entitled him to choose the Karmapa, who is a leader of a different tradition…”59 As one of the Kagyu leaders insisted, “Dharma is about thinking for yourself. It is not about automatically following a teacher in all things, no matter how respected that teacher may be. More than anyone else, Buddhists should respect other people’s rights—their human rights and their religious freedom.”60

What followed was a dozen years of conflict in the Tibetan exile community, punctuated by intermittent riots, intimidation, physical attacks, blacklisting, police harassment, litigation, official corruption, and the looting and undermining of the Karmapa’s monastery in Rumtek by supporters of the Gelugpa faction. All this has caused at least one western devotee to wonder if the years of exile were not hastening the moral corrosion of Tibetan Buddhism.61

What is clear is that not all Tibetan Buddhists accept the Dalai Lama as their theological and spiritual mentor. Though he is referred to as the “spiritual leader of Tibet,” many see this title as little more than a formality. It does not give him authority over the four religious schools of Tibet other than his own, “just as calling the U.S. president the ‘leader of the free world’ gives him no role in governing France or Germany.”62

Not all Tibetan exiles are enamoured of the old Shangri-La theocracy. Kim Lewis, who studied healing methods with a Buddhist monk in Berkeley, California, had occasion to talk at length with more than a dozen Tibetan women who lived in the monk’s building. When she asked how they felt about returning to their homeland, the sentiment was unanimously negative. At first, Lewis assumed that their reluctance had to do with the Chinese occupation, but they quickly informed her otherwise. They said they were extremely grateful “not to have to marry 4 or 5 men, be pregnant almost all the time,” or deal with sexually transmitted diseases contacted from a straying husband. The younger women “were delighted to be getting an education, wanted absolutely nothing to do with any religion, and wondered why Americans were so naïve [about Tibet].”63

The women interviewed by Lewis recounted stories of their grandmothers’ ordeals with monks who used them as “wisdom consorts.” By sleeping with the monks, the grandmothers were told, they gained “the means to enlightenment” — after all, the Buddha himself had to be with a woman to reach enlightenment.

The women also mentioned the “rampant” sex that the supposedly spiritual and abstemious monks practiced with each other in the Gelugpa sect. The women who were mothers spoke bitterly about the monastery’s confiscation of their young boys in Tibet. They claimed that when a boy cried for his mother, he would be told “Why do you cry for her, she gave you up–she’s just a woman.”

The monks who were granted political asylum in California applied for public assistance. Lewis, herself a devotee for a time, assisted with the paperwork. She observes that they continue to receive government checks amounting to $550 to $700 per month along with Medicare. In addition, the monks reside rent free in nicely furnished apartments. “They pay no utilities, have free access to the Internet on computers provided for them, along with fax machines, free cell and home phones and cable TV.”

They also receive a monthly payment from their order, along with contributions and dues from their American followers. Some devotees eagerly carry out chores for the monks, including grocery shopping and cleaning their apartments and toilets. These same holy men, Lewis remarks, “have no problem criticizing Americans for their ‘obsession with material things.’”64

To welcome the end of the old feudal theocracy in Tibet is not to applaud everything about Chinese rule in that country. This point is seldom understood by today’s Shangri-La believers in the West. The converse is also true: To denounce the Chinese occupation does not mean we have to romanticize the former feudal régime. Tibetans deserve to be perceived as actual people, not perfected spiritualists or innocent political symbols. “To idealize them,” notes Ma Jian, a dissident Chinese traveler to Tibet (now living in Britain), “is to deny them their humanity.”65

One common complaint among Buddhist followers in the West is that Tibet’s religious culture is being undermined by the Chinese occupation. To some extent this seems to be the case. Many of the monasteries are closed, and much of the theocracy seems to have passed into history. Whether Chinese rule has brought betterment or disaster is not the central issue here. The question is what kind of country was old Tibet. What I am disputing is the supposedly pristine spiritual nature of that pre-invasion culture. We can advocate religious freedom and independence for a new Tibet without having to embrace the mythology about old Tibet. Tibetan feudalism was cloaked in Buddhism, but the two are not to be equated. In reality, old Tibet was not a Paradise Lost. It was a retrograde repressive theocracy of extreme privilege and poverty, a long way from Shangri-La.

Finally, let it be said that if Tibet’s future is to be positioned somewhere within China’s emerging free-market paradise, then this does not bode well for the Tibetans. China boasts a dazzling 8 percent economic growth rate and is emerging as one of the world’s greatest industrial powers. But with economic growth has come an ever deepening gulf between rich and poor. Most Chinese live close to the poverty level or well under it, while a small group of newly brooded capitalists profit hugely in collusion with shady officials. Regional bureaucrats milk the country dry, extorting graft from the populace and looting local treasuries. Land grabbing in cities and countryside by avaricious developers and corrupt officials at the expense of the populace are almost everyday occurrences. Tens of thousands of grassroot protests and disturbances have erupted across the country, usually to be met with unforgiving police force. Corruption is so prevalent, reaching into so many places, that even the normally complacent national leadership was forced to take notice and began moving against it in late 2006.

Workers in China who try to organize labor unions in the corporate dominated “business zones” risk losing their jobs or getting beaten and imprisoned. Millions of business zone workers toil twelve-hour days at subsistence wages. With the health care system now being privatized, free or affordable medical treatment is no longer available for millions. Men have tramped into the cities in search of work, leaving an increasingly impoverished countryside populated by women, children, and the elderly. The suicide rate has increased dramatically, especially among women.66

China’s natural environment is sadly polluted. Most of its fabled rivers and many lakes are dead, producing massive fish die-offs from the billions of tons of industrial emissions and untreated human waste dumped into them. Toxic effluents, including pesticides and herbicides, seep into ground water or directly into irrigation canals. Cancer rates in villages situated along waterways have skyrocketed a thousand-fold. Hundreds of millions of urban residents breathe air rated as dangerously unhealthy, contaminated by industrial growth and the recent addition of millions of automobiles. An estimated 400,000 die prematurely every year from air pollution. Government environmental agencies have no enforcement power to stop polluters, and generally the government ignores or denies such problems, concentrating instead on industrial growth.67

China’s own scientific establishment reports that unless greenhouse gases are curbed, the nation will face massive crop failures along with catastrophic food and water shortages in the years ahead. In 2006-2007 severe drought was already afflicting southwest China.68

If China is the great success story of speedy free market development, and is to be the model and inspiration for Tibet’s future, then old feudal Tibet indeed may start looking a lot better than it actually was.
http://www.michaelparenti.org/Tibet.html

Michael Parenti is an American political scientist, historian, and author. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University. His works have been translated into at least eighteen languages. His book, “The Assassination of Julius Caesar, A People’s History of Ancient Rome”, was selected as a Book of the Year for 2004 by Online Review of Books and Current Affairs.

“He (the Dalai Lama) headed a social system that was exploitative, terribly terribly unequal, and terribly brutal.”

“You had a privileged priest class, living in utter luxury and opulence, and you had a mass of serfs living in utter misery.”

“His holiness would tell you that he must return to power for the good of his people. In this case “good” may translate to his people living in squaller and his government condoning slavery.”

“As this State Department internal memo reveals, the Dalai Lama at one time took $180,000 a year from the CIA for his living expenses. and $1.5 million a year from the spy agency to finance Tibetan guerrilla operations against the Chinese, which included, running a covert guerrilla training center in Colorado.”

I’m in favour of Buddhism and it’s peaceful wishes. However, this is plainly wrong. In this case it shows the Dalai Lama clearly using violence, leading to deaths and terrorizing people’s lives. I have seen the Dalai lama before and heard his teachings. This is shameful and I’m disappointed.

The Chinese government has made impressive efforts to bring Tibet to the modern world of the 21st century and preserve its traditional culture, a U.S. journalist said on Sunday.

David Jones, the interim managing editor of the Washington Times, said in an email interview with Xinhua that he saw during his trip to Tibet last September that large sums of money had been put into repairing temples and building museums.

Traditional Tibetan singing and dancing were also kept alive as part of the government’s efforts to preserve Tibetan culture, he said.

“Large sums have been spent to preserve and restore Tibet’s temples and monasteries … Almost 30 million U.S. dollars has already been spent on the Potala Palace alone,” he wrote in a report about his trip to Tibet published in October.

“The government also sponsors professional and amateur dance and theater troupes and set aside up to one-third of Tibet’s total area for wildlife preserves,” he added.

In his October report, Jones said officials in Beijing and Lhasa seem to have come to the same conclusion that they could attract tourists to the region by preserving the world’s most original culture.

Jones recalled that he had a “romantic picture” that Tibet was rather a backward and very religious place before he went there, but he was surprised to see a modern Tibet with first-class highways, many SUVs and good communication, and that even yak herders have cell phones and motorbikes.

“It is obvious to me that the government had spent a lot of money to build infrastructure,” he said. “The mobile phone reception in some parts of Tibet is even better than West Virginia.”

He also found the government of Tibetan Autonomous Region is “very much a mixture of Tibetan and Han officials at all levels.”

Jones, a former reporter based in Hong Kong in 1980s, said that he has witnessed China’s dramatic change in politics, economy and social life during several visits to the country from 1983 to 2007.

“Each time I went to China, I was amazed to see how much progress and development that have been (achieved) in such a short time.”

Jones said that he was surprised to see how much more freedom Chinese people enjoy nowadays in choosing their professions and traveling abroad, among others.

He said he realizes westerners should not deny China’s development mode based on its 5,000-year history. They should acknowledge how dramatically China has changed in such a short period and how challenging it is to undertake these changes in such a populous country.

Most Chinese think the West’s real aim is to deny them the triumph they deserve for their success.

By Kishore Mahbubani | NEWSWEEK
May 5, 2008 Issue

The recent crisis over the Olympic torch and Tibet represent an epic clash: not just between Tibetans and Beijing, but between a self-congratulatory Western worldview and the very different vision of a billion-plus Chinese. Until Western leaders start trying to understand the Chinese perspective, friction is likely to grow, and the victims will include the Tibetans themselves—the very people Western leaders say they want to protect.
According to the current U.S. and European narrative, the popular protests in Tibet and elsewhere were entirely justified. The demonstrators pushed a moral cause: to free the poor Tibetans from an oppressive communist government. And the European leaders who decided to boycott the Olympics’ opening ceremonies, like Germany’s Angela Merkel, deserved nothing but praise for their courageous stance.

The Chinese view could not be more different. Before describing it, however, it is vital to dispel a major Western misconception. Many Americans and Europeans think that China’s furious reaction to the protests—a reaction that has now inspired a massive boycott of Western goods and businesses in China—has been the result of media manipulation and information control by Beijing. If only the Chinese public had access to real facts, Westerners think, their attitudes would be different. This is a huge mistake. The reality is that some of the strongest anger toward the West at the moment is coming from liberal Western-educated Chinese intellectuals who have access to accurate information. China today enjoys the most competent governance it’s ever had, and its elites are intelligent, well educated and sophisticated—the exact opposite of the “goons and thugs” described by CNN’s Jack Cafferty.

The Chinese are so angry because virtually all of them believe that the Western protests have had little to do with human rights, Tibet or Darfur. Instead, the Chinese think, the West’s real motivation is to deny China the triumph it deserves for its enormous successes. According to this view, Westerners cannot stomach the thought that China is poised to hold the best Olympics ever. Such a spectacle would vividly demonstrate how power has shifted from West to East. This would be intolerable, and thus Americans and Europeans are dead set on finding some way to disrupt the Games—and if Tibet or Darfur won’t suffice, they’ll find some other method. As several Western-educated Chinese friends have whispered to me, “Kishore, this is pure racism. The West cannot bear the thought of China’s succeeding.”

Chinese skepticism about the Western commitment to human rights is well founded. Indeed, there is something ironic about those who have committed genocide against American Indians or Australian Aborigines now castigating China on Tibet. Furthermore, Guantánamo—which Amnesty International has described as “the gulag of our times”—plus Abu Ghraib and European complicity in Washington’s extraordinary rendition program have badly damaged the West’s credibility and legitimacy.

Most Chinese also believe that Tibetans have received special treatment from Beijing. After the disastrous Cultural Revolution, in which all Chinese suffered, Deng Xiaoping adopted a more pragmatic approach to the region. Ruined religious sites were repaired, monasteries were reopened, new monks were allowed to join orders and the Tibetan language was permitted to be used more extensively than before. Chinese leaders believe that China has exercised sovereignty over Tibet for 700 years now, ever since the Yuan dynasty—one reason the “Free Tibet” slogan angers them so much. Then there’s the recent territorial disintegration of the Soviet Union and memories of how the West seized Chinese territory in the 19th century: still more reasons why Chinese suspicions run deep.

What really frustrates Beijing is the West’s apparent lack of comprehension of China’s aims for the Olympics. In 2005, World Bank head Robert Zoellick called on China to become a “responsible stakeholder.” The Beijing Olympics were meant to symbolize China’s willingness to do just that, and the Chinese expected their efforts to be welcomed enthusiastically. But now most Western leaders seem intent on slamming the door in Beijing’s face instead. The tragedy is that this will only stoke angry Chinese nationalism, which has already begun to surface. A fire-breathing Chinese dragon will clamp down on Tibet even harder than the current government has, which would serve no one’s interests. The West’s failure to recognize this fact demonstrates a serious failure of long-term strategic thinking.

If Europe’s leaders really want to show political courage, they should attend the Olympics’ opening ceremonies. Doing so would encourage China to open up further and engage the world. Over time, this will liberalize Chinese society and even lead to greater political and cultural autonomy for the Tibetans. So far, only one major Western leader has shown the requisite courage and foresight: George W. Bush. It is hoped numerous leaders from other continents will join him in Beijing. When that happens, it will only underscore Europe’s growing irrelevance: a tragedy that Europeans are bringing upon themselves.

Mahbubani is dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore and the author of “The New Asian Hemisphere.”

TIBET – A REALITY CHECK

N. RAM writes, after a five day visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China.

“The sky is turquoise, the sun is golden, The Dalai Lama is away from the Potala, Making trouble in the west. Yet Tibet’s on the move.”

Volume 17 – Issue 18, Sep. 02 – 15, 2000
India’s National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU

TIBET – A REALITY CHECK

N. RAM writes, after a five day visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China.

“The sky is turquoise, the sun is
golden,
The Dalai Lama is away from the Potala,
Making trouble in the west.
Yet Tibet’s on the move.”

FOR an Indian in Tibet who has no sympathy whatsoever for the Dalai Lama’s separatist, revanchist and backward-looking agenda, this passable adaptation of an old Tibetan song seems to fit contemporary realities. A careful reading of the facts of the case reveals that this ideological and political agenda, pursued essentially through external agency, is three projects rolled into one – splitting Tibet from China, carving out a ‘Greater Tibet’ through ethnic cleansing, and restoring a moth-eaten theocracy , the ancien regime with some modest, if not quite cosmetic, ‘democratic’ changes. Each one of these projects can be seen to represent a pipe-dream, especially if one remembers that – unlike in the case of Kashmir – there is not a single country and government in the world that disputes the status of Tibet, that does not recognise Tibet as part of China, that is willing to accord any kind of legal recognition to the Dalai Lama’s ‘government-in-exile’ based in Dharmasala.

An array of apartment and office buildings in central Lhasa. The transforming effects of modernisation are very visible in Tibet’s capital.

Yet there can be little question that there is a Tibet question, that it has a problematical international as well as Sino-Indian dimension, that it continues to cause concern to the political leadership and people of China, and that it serves to confuse and divide public opinion abroad and, to an extent, at home. This is essentially a function of the coming together of a host of objective and subjective factors. These are the Dalai Lama’s religious charisma combined with the iconic international status of Tibetan Buddhism; his long-lastingness and tenacity; the ideological-political interests and purposes he has served over four decades and more; his considerable wealth and global investments and resources mobilised from the Tibetan diaspora in variou s countries; the grievous cultural and human damage done, in Tibet as much as in the rest of China, during the decade of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-76); the nature of the ‘independent Tibet’ movement that has rallied around the person and office of the Dalai Lama; the links and synergies ‘His Holiness’ has managed to establish with Hollywood, the media, legislators, and other influential constituencies in the West; the plausible, yet demonstrably tendentious and false, propaganda material generated by this anti-China and anti-Communist campaign in the post-Cold War era; and (from an Indian standpoint, not the least troubling aspect) the Dalai Lama’s continuing Indian base of operations.

Historically, from the second half of the thirteenth century when China came under the Mongol Yuan dynasty founded by Kublai Khan, Tibet has experienced the merging of religious and temporal power in a peculiar type of theocracy. With the ascendancy of t he Gelug, or Yellow, sect of Tibetan Buddhism, the honorific ‘Dalai’ (meaning ‘Ocean’), conferred on the leader of the sect by the ruler of a Mongol tribe, appears during the Ming dynasty in the sixteenth century. Historical records show that the institu tion of the Dalai Lama as an ‘incarnate’ politico-religious supremo – recognised and indeed empowered by the Chinese Central Government – dates back to the middle of the seventeenth century, when the Great Fifth received a formal title and a golden seal of authority from the Qing Emperor whom he visited in Beijing. From that time, there have been Dalai Lamas powerful and inept, ascetic as well as pleasure-seeking, learned as well as shallow, masterful as well as manipulated, long-lived but also cut off in youth (possibly poisoned) in several cases.

The fourteenth Dalai Lama, like his predecessor who was caught up in powerful currents of history involving British imperialism, a China undergoing big socio-political change, the ambitions of Tsarist Russia, an India moving towards freedom, and conflict ual processes within Tibet itself, is one of the longest lasting in the series. As the pre-eminent Tibetan Buddhist leader, ‘His Holiness’ has a hold among the faithful and a wider influence that must not be underestimated. But, as the Chinese official v iew makes clear, given the protracted experience of dealing with him, he cannot be treated merely, or even primarily, as a religious leader. He is a consummate politician leading a movement that seeks to take ‘Greater Tibet’ away from China – an anti-com munist and separatist political figure masquerading as a compassionate man of religion and ‘art of happiness’ guru.

”The Dalai Lama has several balls in the air at the same time,” a retired senior Indian diplomat who admires him observed to me recently. Thus, ‘His Holiness’ has been able to maintain in a recent interview to Time magazine (issue of July 17, 20 00): ”Let’s follow the middle path. We don’t want complete independence. Beijing can manage the economy and foreign policy, but genuine Tibetan self-rule is the best way to preserve our culture.” The Dalai Lama has claimed he has been consistent in his post-1959 stand. But that has not prevented him from running a ‘government-in-exile’, or accommodating an ‘independent Tibet” movement, or sponsoring a great deal of hostile propaganda material, or soliciting and accepting any kind of external help to destabilise China’s sovereignty or control over Tibet.

As early as September 1959, the Dalai Lama, acting against Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s specific advice, sought, unsuccessfully, to get the United Nations to intervene in Tibet. Over the past 25 years, following a decision taken by his ‘government-i n-exile’ in Dharmasala, he has travelled extensively abroad to rally support for the internationalisation of the Tibet question and made various ‘realistic’ proposals for its ’satisfactory and just solution’. These have included a ‘Five Point Peace Plan’ unfurled in a September 1987 address to members of the U.S. Congress; the elaboration of these five points in the so-called Strasbourg Proposal, presented in June 1988 in an address to members of the European Parliament; the withdrawal, in March 1991, o f his personal commitment to the ideas expressed in the Strasbourg Proposal on the basis of the allegation that the Chinese leadership had a ”closed and negative” attitude to the problem; and an abrasive and propagandistic open letter written to Deng Xiaoping in September 1992. In all his major public pronouncements, the Dalai Lama has taken the stand that Tibet has been an independent nation from ancient times, that it has been a strategic ‘buffer state’ in the heart of Asia guaranteeing the region’ s stability, that it has never ‘conceded’ its ’sovereignty’ to China or any other foreign power, that China’s control over Tibet is in the nature of ‘occupation’ by a ‘colonial’ power, and that ‘the Tibetan people have never accepted’ the loss of ‘our na tional sovereignty’. He has also repeatedly spoken of ’six million Tibetans’ and put forward the demand for the re-constitution of a ‘Greater Tibet’ known as ‘Cholka-Sum’ and comprising the areas of ‘U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo’.

At the same time, the Dalai Lama has made himself out to be a moderate and realist committed to the Buddhist ‘middle path’ and to non-violence despite contra-acting tendencies among Tibetans. Thus, he has claimed on various occasions that he is not seeki ng total independence from China; that he is not seeking any active political role for himself in ‘future Tibet’; that he is willing to negotiate a future for Tibet as ”a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the peop le for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People’s Republic of China”; and that he might settle for full-fledged or high-grade autonomy, with the China’s Central Government having charge of me rely defence and foreign affairs.

During a period of economic reform, opening up to the outside world and the pursuit of socio-political stability, China’s renewed interest in arriving at an amicable settlement with the Dalai Lama and creating reasonable conditions for him to return was framed by two major policy statements by top leaders. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced in a media interview that ”the Dalai Lama may return, but only as a Chinese citizen” and that ”we have but one demand – patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late.” In May 1991, Prime Minister Li Peng clarified, also in a media interview, that ”we have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is an inalienable part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling… All matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed.” But after several rounds of informal talks and contacts with the Dalai Lama’s emissaries and fact-finding delegations between 1979 and 1992 and after watching the Dalai Lama’s performance on the international stage, the Chinese Government came to a sort of tentative conclusion by the time it held the Third National Conference on Work in Tibet in 1994. This conclusion was that the ‘Dalai clique’ was demonstrab ly insincere, that it was working overtime to separate Tibet from China and destabilise the situation in the autonomous region in concert with ‘China’s international enemies’, and that its actual demands were tantamount to independence, ’semi-independenc e’ or ‘independence in disguise’.

What is clear to any objective observer is the following. In his political role, the Dalai Lama has performed like a confidence trickster whose utterances and actions spring from a practised repertoire of misrepresentations, half-truths, and demon strable falsehoods about the facts of the case.

A FIVE DAY visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in July 2000 provided me a rare journalistic opportunity to attempt some reality testing of Dharmasala’s main campaign themes. In psychology and psychoanalysis, reality testing is the technique of objective evaluation of an emotion or thought against real life, as a faculty present in normal individuals but defective in some psychotics. Here, the reality testing is not against what the protagonists and victims of the ‘independent Tibet’ campai gn feel or believe, but against what is systematically put out by the campaign as defining themes. Even if they have little formal official backing, these themes have acquired some kind of cult status on the world stage and shaped the p erceptions of considerable numbers of people who have no contact with the realities of Tibet. What direct observation, discussions with a cross-section of Tibetan as well as Han Chinese people, the factual testimony provided by numerous western visitors (especially those representing non governmental organisations, including teachers, doctors, medical workers and volunteers participating in poverty-alleviation projects), and an examination of salient verifiable data, published as well as unpublished, r eveal is the political conmanship that underlies much of the international campaign against the record of the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China in Tibet. Frontline presents, in this Cover Story, the main findings of this r eality testing.

Theme No. 1

A major theme in the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign is that China’s role in Tibet is that of a ‘colonial’ power exploiting the occupied land’s wealth and resources, subjugating its people, and suppressing its freedom. Part of this theme is the asserti on that even for the post-1979 period, when some economic improvements took place, official statistics and ”the Chinese Government’s claims” of social and economic development in Tibet ”cannot be taken at face value”; and that in any case ”it is not the Tibetans who benefit from the economic development of Tibet” but ”Chinese settlers in Tibet, their Government and military, and their business enterprises.”

GREG BAKER/AP
Chinese Vice-President Hu Jingtao, Premier Zhu Rongji, President Jiang Zemin and Chairman of the National People’s Congress Li Peng.

This theme links up opportunistically with a long-observed tendency in colonial and post-colonial western attitudes towards Tibet. Idealising Tibet’s far-from-the-madding-crowd isolation, primitive impenetrability, frozen-in-time traditions and Lama-led spirituality and treating its denizens as chosen people holding the key to happiness, peace and spiritual liberation (at least until the Chinese arrived) is one side of this tendency. The other side is hostility, mostly of the patronising kind, vented bo th against unification with China and the process of modernisation that you see at work everywhere in Tibet.

Aside from the fact that this first major theme of the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign is identical to one of the core arguments of the Pakistan-supported extremist secessionist movement in Kashmir, reality testing for Tibet on the set of issues addres sed by this kind of argument can be on its own merits, sui generis so to speak.

Observed Reality

Flying into Gongkar airport, Tibet’s major airport located in Shannan Prefecture, is a novel as well as sobering experience. Towards the end of a three-hour flight originating in Xian, China’s ancient capital (which used to be known as Changan), you catc h a spectacular glimpse of topographies and landforms that seem straight out of Browning’s strangest poems. Nothing you have read or seen in photographs prepares you for the vastness, the remoteness, the unnatural natural beauty, the flat-versus-mountain ous, dry-versus-riverine, fertile-versus-barren singularity of this once-great sea that has become a high altitude plateau averaging 4,000 metres, the ‘roof of the world’. Tibet has less oxygen, more sunlight, longer hours of daylight, lower temperatures , less precipitation, more changeable weather, more great mountains and rivers, a larger collection of lakes and nature reserves, and a lower density of population than most people are used to.

But it is equally true that those who warn you about Tibet – against breathing difficulty, against altitude sickness, and against any kind of physical exertion upon landing – exaggerate for the most part. Unless specific health problems (even a transient problem like a bad cold) contra-indicate a flying visit to Tibet, acclimatisation is hardly the arduous challenge that anecdotal evidence and some guidebooks make it out to be. Further, you discover soon enough that geographically, physically, climatica lly, socio-economically, culturally and politically, the Tibet Autonomous Region of China is far from being a world apart – far-away, impenetrable, and inscrutable – that Hollywood’s fantasising about Shangri-la, ‘Seven Years in Tibet’, ‘Kundun’, and Lam aic Buddhism suggests.

Tibet is on the move. This becomes clear as soon as you are on the road, either to Lhasa, a smooth, asphalted 95 km northward drive from Gongkar, or to Tsetang, a somewhat longer drive to the east that we took straight from the airport. As you spe ed along the highway, you are offered rapid frame alternations of the new and the old, the modern and the traditional, in what can be a heady brew of first impressions. In Tibet, as in most parts of the world, you can end up seeing and feeling, more or l ess, what you are pre-disposed to seeing and feeling. And much of this pre-disposition in the West, especially in the United States, is the outcome of prolonged exposure to the ‘independence for Tibet’ propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Dalai Lama, aided and abetted by Hollywood, by a certain genre of highly subjective travel writing, and, at a more sophisticated level, by ‘manufacture of consent’ in the media passing off as professional reportage and analysis.

Discrediting modernisation through selective, tendentious description has become a favourite device in recent first-hand western writing on Tibet. Whether it is ”Tibetan Tragedy,” a Time magazine cover story written by Anthony Spaeth (issue of J uly 17, 2000), or a more pretentious two-part essay by Ian Baruma in The New York Review of Books (”Found Horizon” in the issue of June 29, 2000 and ”Tibet Disenchanted” in the issue of July 20, 2000), discos, karaoke bars, brothels, gambling casinos and so forth loom large in the reportage and analysis. It is as though these are the distinguishing features of the modernising process that is on in Tibet, as part of China’s gigantic, Deng Xiaoping-led post-1979 economic transformation. In Baru ma’s evocative account, the dominant image of modernising Tibet under China’s ‘colonial’ rule is sleaze associated with wild frontier ‘Chinese-style capitalism’: ”Chinese carpet-baggers, hucksters, hookers, gamblers, hoodlums, corrupt officials, and oth er desperadoes lusting after quick cash.”

Unless the visitor chooses to get obsessively trapped in such images that are a small part of the reality, what he or she sees is a different kind of modernisation. New or improved schools, a system of compulsory schooling for nine or six or three years (depending on the area and the stage of objective development), and quite competitive higher educational institutions. A bewildering range of consumer goods and shops. Modern blue-tinted office buildings, new residential complexes, and a great deal of co nstruction activity in town and country. Hospitals and health centres dispensing both modern and a flourishing Tibetan indigenous medicine. Surplus grain production, new agricultural methods and practices, tractors, surplus-producing peasants, commoditis ed agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, hydroelectric, geothermal, horticulture, and animal husbandry projects. Small and medium-sized industries and businesses. Ambitious infrastructure projects. A sustained economic growth rate close to 10 per c ent per year. Nascent scientific research, surveys, and social science activity. A substantial Tibetan Archives, active promotion and use of the Tibetan language (written and spoken), and big projects, funded largely by the Central Government, to record, collate, edit and publish Tibetan literary classics, such as King Gesar, and Buddhist sacred texts. Extensive repair, renovation, restoration and protection of cultural treasures under a strict and elaborate cultural protection regime. A splendid Tibet Autonomous Region Museum in Lhasa, with a floor space of 21,000 square metres, constructed during 1994-97 at a cost of $12 million. Environmental consciousness and concerns expressed in strict regulations, policies, an Environmental Protection Bur eau, afforestation, greening. New roads, highways, cars, two-wheelers, tractors, speeding trucks and every kind of modern vehicle. Newspapers, radio, television, mobile phones, twenty-first century telecom, even a few Internet bars. A nascent interest in biotechnology. Hotels for various budgets, organised tourism, and a host of other modern tertiary activities.

KIRAN PRASAD
The Dalai Lama.

This is not surprising given the post-1979 policies of reform and opening up, which have brought enormous economic changes across China. Under the impact of these policies, over the past six years the economy of the Tibet Autonomous Region has grown at a n annual rate close to 10 per cent, which is above the national average. Last year, the Region’s GDP grew at 9.6 per cent. Recently released data on GDP growth for the first half of 2000 revealed that Tibet’s 8.9 per cent was again above the national ave rage (8.2 per cent). Economic growth during the second half of the year is expected to be higher.

At the same time, the traditional is very much on view in town and country. As you speed along the highway to Tsetang, you catch a glimpse of how the bulk of Tibetans live, in mud and stone houses, cultivating small plots and tending livestock; prayer fl ags fluttering; primitive farming and nomadic practices; poor living conditions; colourful long skirts, striped aprons and beads; people squatting road-side; children working at home, in the fields, or tending livestock. This reflects the truth that the level of economic development, the development of productive forces, and the living standards of the people in the Tibet Autonomous Region are visibly lower than the Chinese average.

Tibet is clearly at a preliminary stage of modernisation. To ask it to remain frozen in its traditions, as romantic disillusionment with the process of modernisation demands, is to be unrealistic as well as unfair to the mass of Tibetan people. For all t heir observable religiosity, they are as keen as people anywhere else to solve basic problems of food, clothing, shelter, transport, education, health, and decent work, and to improve living standards as quickly as possible.

A VISIT to a surplus-producing peasant family on the outskirts of Tsetang in Shannan Prefecture makes clear these aspirations. The head of the ten-member family, seven of whose members still live in this unpretentious but spacious and traditionally decor ated house, is 56-year-old Lhodru. He and his wife are illiterate, but four of the five children have been to school. (The girl is the exception.) In the 1950s, the family had no land of its own and subsisted on raising donkeys and some cattle, although, as Lhodru noted, it was not a family of serfs and did not belong to the poorest of the poor. The family acquired some land after the Democratic Reform in 1959, but until the late 1970s it produced just enough to keep its head above water.

Today, Lhodru’s family owns 22 mu of land, that is 1.46 hectares, operates a tractor bought with a bank loan, owns six pigs and five heads of cattle, and sells grain as well as milk in the market. The proof of its improving living standards can be seen i n the main living room, in the elaborately decorated furniture and a range of consumer goods. According to Lhodru, electrification arrived here around 1979 and the basic improvements came after the whole village was shifted to this location at the end of the 1970s. Of the five children, three, including the young woman, live with the parents. The youngest member of the family, a boy, is in high school; the young woman has a job in the country administration; and of the three remaining sons, one works in the fields, another is a tractor-driver, and the third makes a living riding a rickshaw in the local market. Lhodru observes that as living standards improve and the market economy develops, attitudes, beliefs and aspirations undergo a significant chang e, especially among the young. Secondly, he notes, how specific families fare in the new situation depends very much on capabilities within the family, which vary considerably; his family has done quite well in response to the new economic opportunities, benefited from the Central Government’s preferential policies towards Tibet, and lifted itself above a subsistence status, but it is by no means a rich family.

In Lhasa, the transforming effects of modernisation are much more visible, whether you visit a factory, the main bazaar or a large department store or a high school or a hospital, or simply look around and observe the new office buildings, the new-style residential blocks, and the extensive construction in progress.

These realities are profoundly different from those that used to prevail in old Tibet. One of the recurrent complaints of the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign is that the Chinese Government has sought to ‘justify its policy on Tibet’ by ‘painting the da rkest picture of traditional Tibetan society.’ But the facts are indisputable.

Historical and social records and the accounts of foreign visitors show that before the 1959 Democratic Reform, which might have actually come later had there not been an armed uprising and had the Dalai Lama not fled to India, Tibet was a feudal serfdom . Land as well as most means of production were in the hands of the three categories of estate-owners – government officials, nobles, and upper class Lamas – who comprised merely 5 per cent of the population. The mass of the population, serfs and slave s, lived in extreme poverty, as appendages to estates owned by their masters, lacking education, health care, personal freedom, any kind of entitlement, obliged to provide unpaid labour services or ulag, an expansive Tibetan term for extortionate taxes, corvee and parasitical land rent. Agriculture was largely of the slash-and-burn kind, modern industry was virtually non-existent, and transportation was chiefly on animal or human back. Life in general was brutish and short, with diseases r ampant, the population stagnant, and life expectancy at birth hovering around 36. At the top of this profoundly inequitable and oppressive system sat the institution and person of the Dalai Lama (whatever be the ‘reformist’ fourteenth Dalai Lama’s subjec tive claims and feelings on this state of affairs).

N. RAM
Inside the Potala Palace, surely one of the world’s surviving wonders. The palace was listed in 1994 as a World Cultural Heritage Site by UNESCO.

As against these basic realities, the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign advances the argument that there was plenty of Buddhist kindness, compassion, and caring in old Tibet. While this may be true, there is only so much that kindness, compassion, and ca ring can achieve in the face of overpowering objective realities in a feudal serf-owning society and an extremely backward economy, where 95 per cent of the population was illiterate and the overwhelming majority lacked the ways and means to meet basic – even subsistence – needs.

Since Liberation in 1949, China’s economic, political and social policies have gone through some sharp swings, twists, and turns. Such volatility has taken a considerable toll of the economic and social development effort, with the decade of the Cultural Revolution bringing nothing short of all-round calamity. Nevertheless, the record of four decades of democratic reform in the economic field in the Tibet Autonomous Region has been solid. Basic needs have been met to a substantial extent; social and hum an development indicators have risen impressively; poverty has been reduced; Tibet has acquired the fundamentals of a modern economy with briskly growing primary, industrial, and tertiary sectors; infrastructure, especially roads, highways, the energy se ctor, and telecommunications, have been developed on an ambitious scale; free medicare has been provided to a large proportion of the population; and Tibetan society, which is, in its composition, younger than most other parts of China, has become a lear ning society.

According to an official publication, there have been four waves of accelerated economic development since the early 1950s.

The first wave, which came in the 1950s, saw large-scale infrastructure construction especially in the field of transport; this wave saw the rapid completion of three major highways linking Tibet to Sichuan, Qinghai and Nepal, and the Gongkar airport, wh ich helped end the isolation of Tibet.

The second wave came in the mid-1980s, triggered by two National Conferences on Work in Tibet held in 1980 and 1984 jointly by the Communist Party of China and the State Council. In 1980, the Central Government decided on two policies towards Tibet that would not be changed for a long time to come -”the land will be used by households, and will be managed by them on their own” and ”livestock will be owned, raised and managed by households on their own.” These policies have been extremely popular amo ng farmers and herdsmen who make up four-fifths of TAR’s population and have led to an upsurge in agricultural production. In 1984, the Central Government mobilised manpower and material resources from nine provinces and municipalities to help Tibet bui ld 43 projects as part of the ‘Golden Keys Programme’. The total investment involved was about 480 million yuan.

The third wave came in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the state invested more than 3.2 billion yuan in huge infrastructure projects focussed on energy and transportation. Among other things, this has brought a comprehensive development project in t he Three River Area, that is, the area around the Yarlung Zangbo, Lhasa, and Nyang Rivers encompassing agriculture, water conservancy, and afforestation. The ambitious project is expected to benefit more than 45 per cent of TAR’s cultivated land, 18 coun ties and a population of 830,000, to lead to the development of a new base of commercial agriculture and light industry, and to spur development in the rest of Tibet.

The fourth wave, initiated at the Third National Conference on Work in Tibet held in July 1994, has been by far the most ambitious in the series. It has meant more investment, more projects, wider coverage of areas, and a greater emphasis on quality and accountability. The Third Forum set an annual growth target of 10 per cent for Tibet’s economy over the medium term and decided that the Central Government together with 29 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities would help TAR construct 62 proj ects ”without compensation,” involving a total investment of more than four billion yuan. Virtually all these projects have been completed ahead of schedule. The target of quadrupling the 1980 GDP by 2000 was actually fulfilled two years ahead of sched ule.

A new wave of economic development in Tibet is expected to be generated once China’s Western Development campaign, a strategic push for large-scale development of the western region during the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), gets into full swing. For a year, Tibet’s Development and Planning Commission has been working on a detailed plan to fit into this strategy. The plan is expected to be ready in early 2001. It will then go to the CPC Central Committee and to the TAR government for approval.

Colonialism, invariably, involves a huge drain of resources and wealth from the colony or semi-colony. In the case of Tibet, between 1950 and 1998, the Central Government invested an estimated 40 billion yuan, provided major financial subsidies, and tran sported vast quantities of material. Particularly after some stock-taking in the early 1980s by the Communist Party of China, which came to the conclusion that conditions in Tibet were unacceptably poor and backward and the level of development in Tibet was unacceptably low, the stepping up of assistance to TAR from the Central Government and provinces and municipalities has made all the difference, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, to TAR’s economic performance.

Tibet, like other autonomous regions, is a major beneficiary of preferential policies that have been in operation since the mid-1960s and been firmed up by the Central Government over the past two decades. Among other things, this involves a low tax poli cy, a no-ceiling policy for loans given to the region, preferential interest rates, and a 100 per cent retention rate for the region’s export earnings.

N. RAM
The devout elderly turning prayer-wheels at Shol village, the entrance to the Potala Palace at the southern foot of Marpo Ri.

The results, gleaned from the China Statistical Yearbook, 1999 (published by China Statistics Press, Beijing), are revealing. Tibet’s GDP at the end of 1998 was 9.12 billion yuan, with the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors contributing 34.3 per cen t, 22.2 per cent and 43.5 per cent respectively. The region’s per capita GDP was a creditable 3,716 yuan. Per capita income in rural households was 1,232 yuan, which was 57 per cent of the comparable national average. Tibetan rural households spent signi ficantly more of their living expenditure on food and clothing, and significantly less on education, culture and recreational articles and services, than the comparable national average. Rural Tibetans consumed more or less the same quantity of grain per capita as other Chinese, but significantly less vegetables, poultry, eggs, aquatic products, and liquor. They had a lower consumption of almost all consumer goods, including bicycles, sewing machines, watches, washing machines, refrigerators and TV sets , but scored higher with respect to radio sets and radio-cassette players.

The statistics suggest that people in urban Tibet are quite advantageously placed. They have greater per capita gross living space than the national average. About 73 per cent of them have access to piped water. Access to public transportation, paved roa ds, public green areas and other civic amenities is, in per capita terms, better than the national average.

BEFORE 1951, Tibet had nothing like a modern educational system. Monastic education, going back a thousand years and focussing on the study of Buddhist scriptures and to some extent the Tibetan language, was the leading form of education. In addition, ab out 20 schools run by local governments and some 100 small-scale private schools together catered to a total student body of less than 1,000 in Tibet. These schools outside the monastic system were meant for the training of lay and monk officials or for imparting a modicum of basic education – reading, writing and arithmetic besides the recitation of Buddhist scriptures – to the children of aristocratic, wealthy, and business families.

After the Revolution of 1911 put an end to the Qing dynasty in China, the thirteenth Dalai Lama decreed the establishment of a Tibetan language primary school in every county in Tibet, stipulating that “all children aged 7 to 15 must attend government-ru n schools.” This experiment led to the setting up of several Tibetan language primary schools but on account of local government corruption and opposition from reactionaries, the schools were closed and the programme was abandoned. Prior to peaceful libe ration in 1951, a pathetic two per cent of school-age Tibetan children were in school and the illiteracy rate was an estimated 95 per cent.

Modern education made progress in Tibet after peaceful liberation, but the Cultural Revolution represented a major setback. Over the past two decades, developing education in Tibet has been identified at the highest political level as a strategic task.

According to official educational statistics, in 1999 the Tibet Autonomous Region had 820 primary schools, 101 middle schools, and 3,033 teaching centres with a combined enrolment of 354,644 students. A comprehensive modern educational system going up fr om kindergarten to university level and including technical and vocational secondary schools had taken initial shape. A teaching and administrative staff of more than 22,279, including 19,276 full-time teachers, represented the backbone of the school sys tem. Of this staff, 80 per cent was drawn from ethnic nationalities, chiefly the Tibetan nationality. There were four institutions of higher learning (Tibet University, the Tibet Ethnic Institute, the Tibet Institute of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, and the Tibet College of Tibetan Medicine) with a combined enrolment of 5,249 students. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, more than 20,000 students have graduated from Tibet’s higher educational institutions and over 23,000 from its secondary voc ational schools; and the overwhelming proportion of this qualified workforce has been Tibetan, contrary to what is alleged by the Dalai Lama-led campaign.

Theme No. 2

A key theme of the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign is that China’s ‘colonialism’ in Tibet is expressed in a state-sponsored policy of population transfer and Hanisation, that is, bringing in large numbers of Han settlers, administrators, and military a nd security personnel so as to swamp sparsely populated Tibet and render Tibetans a minority in their own land. This allegation goes hand in hand with references to ’six million Tibetans’ – which reads like an egregious absurdity until one realises that this dishonestly cited number is connected with the project of establishing ‘Greater Tibet’ through ethnic cleansing and re-constituting the boundaries of four existing Chinese provinces or autonomous regions, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan.

The Dalai Lama himself has repeated the allegation of state-sponsored Hanisation and population transfer in various forums, with the result that over the long term it has become a staple of international anti-Chinese and anti-Communist propaganda in rel ation to Tibet. For example, he asserted in his September 1987 address to members of the U.S. Congress while presenting his so-called Five Point Peace Plan: ”The population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, which the government in Peking pursues in order to force a ‘final solution’ to the Tibetan problem by reducing the Tibetan population to an insignificant and disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself, must be stopped. The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into Tibet in violation of the Fourth Genev a Convention (1949) threatens the very existence of Tibetans as a distinct people.” The next year, in his address to members of the European Parliament which saw the unveiling of the so-called Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama asserted that ”the curr ent Chinese leadership” was, while implementing certain reforms, ”promoting a massive population transfer onto the Tibetan plateau” and that this policy had ”already reduced the six million Tibetans to a minority.” More recently, in his interview to Time magazine (issue of July 17, 2000), he claimed that ”now, in many of the bigger towns like Lhasa, Tibetans are a minority,” adding for good measure: ”Their lifestyle is changing; their language is half-Tibetan, half-Chinese.”

N. RAM
Street scene in Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama’s extremist dissatisfaction with any scepticism about his assertions on ‘population transfer policy and practices’ was conveyed in a formal comment sent by T.C. Tethong, member of the ‘Kashag’ and ‘Minister, Information & International Rel ations, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharmasala’ to the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on the organisation’s December 1997 report on Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Indicating that he was sending the comment at the instance of the Dalai Lama, Tethong asserted: ”As for the figures of Chinese and Tibetan population in various parts of Tibet, the ICJ relies heavily on Ch inese statistics of dubious validity since China has consistently denied and tried to hide its population transfer into Tibet. Even the figures cited from the report by the Tibet Support Group UK greatly underrate the number of Chinese currently in the s o-called Tibet Autonomous Region. As of today, there are 7.5 million Chinese settlers in Tibet as opposed to six million Tibetans. In addition, there are an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Chinese troops stationed in Tibet, a figure quoted as the nearest ap proximation of the actual number by research institutions around the world.”

For well over a decade now, the Dalai Lama, and the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign literature, have made play with the phantom number of ‘’six million Tibetans” – who they claim have been reduced to a minority in ‘Tibet’. Swallowing this figure witho ut any independent verification or exercise of mind and without even waking up to the loaded political context in which this figure is cited by the Dalai Lama, the Time magazine cover story makes this assertion: ”In the so-called Tibetan Autonomo us Region, ethnic Tibetans now number 6 million, or only 44 per cent of the population, according to the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile. China disputes those figures, but its own census data is from 1990, before the most recent waves of Han Chinese imm igrants” (July 17, 2000). This means TAR’s population is 13.64 million!

Population Realities

The truth about the population and demographic profile of any country, or any significant region in a country, can be studied only on the basis of the data available in that country. Typically, over the past century and more, these data have been generat ed by decennial censuses. (The first Census of India was conducted in 1871.) Whatever be the methodological limitations and shortcomings of censuses of population, and interim estimates and projections based on their findings, there is no gainsaying the greater reliability of data generated by censuses compared with guesstimates of the kind put out in 1951 and 1953 by the Dalai Lama’s government, which simply lacked the ways and means to conduct censuses, or even scientific sample surveys, in Tibet. Sel f-evidently, the truth about the population and demographic profile of the Tibet Autonomous Region of China (or, for that matter, the population and demographic profile of Tibetans distributed across provinces and autonomous regions) cannot be gleaned fr om fanciful assertions of the kind put out by the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign, by the Dalai Lama himself, or by Time magazine.

The latest Chinese official estimate of the population of TAR is 2.64 million, of which people of Tibetan nationality are estimated to be 94 to 95 per cent. What can explain the sensational gap between this population estimate and the figure put out in Time magazine’s cover story on Tibet? No demographic expert, no honest lay observer of Tibetan realities believes that the problem is with China’s 1990 Census. No expert or honest lay observer takes seriously the speculation that the decade-old Cen sus findings might have drowned in ‘waves’ (note the racial connotation of the phrase) of Han Chinese migrants. The last Census of India was conducted in 1991, but that does not invalidate expert updates and projections on the Indian population, or its r egional or spatial or social profile. Such estimates and projections can, of course, be verified against the actual findings of the 2001 Census. It is Time magazine’s ideologically blinkered, propagandistic and wildly inaccurate representation of Tibetan realities that suffers from a credibility gap. Further, Tibet is not a hermetically sealed remote fastness where, if it is true that Hanisation in ‘waves’ or state-sponsored population transfer over four decades has rendered Tibetans into a minor ity – let alone in the whole autonomous region, even in one Prefecture or one urban centre such as Lhasa or Xigaze – that social truth can be covered up, or kept a state secret. This is particularly so in a situation where demographic and social realitie s are increasingly transparent and verifiable by, among others, NGOs with access to Tibet, teachers, doctors, medical workers and others working as volunteers at the ground level, visiting experts and academics, and representatives of governments and mul tilateral agencies like the World Bank.

There is no need here to enter into any kind of digression on Tibetan Buddhism: its various monasteries, temples and sects, the high Lamas, Living Buddhas and grand incarnations, the senior, middling and lowly monks and nuns, the debates, rituals and bel iefs, and the steady streams of revenue that monasteries and temples are able to collect from all categories of lay people. But the point needs to be made here that although there was a great deal in this system that needed protection, there was consider able scope for reform and enforcement of the rule of law, a modern concept. Buddhism as a religion emphasises kindness and compassion. But the traditional Tibetan Buddhist religious community was far from being a unified or homogeneous community in any s ense. It was organised on rigid hierarchical lines where learning but also other factors, especially politics, played a significant part. Within this monastic and Lamaic system, there were contradictions, schisms, conflicts, tensions, and cruelty. Second ly, there was a strong class system at work in Lamaism, with the majority of monks and nuns being poor, put upon, and poorly educated. At the working level, the system was characterised by huge gaps in wealth, status, and command of commodities and capab ilities. Thirdly, nuns did not enjoy the same status and rights as monks since the doctrine stipulates that ”the status of nuns is under that of the ordinary monks” and the old Tibetan law laid down that ”women cannot become involved in political affa irs.” Fourthly, in pre-Democratic Reform Tibet, the practice of sending children of tender age

In Western countries, the movement to ‘free Tibet’ from Chinese occupation is very popular among the 57 different varieties of liberals and human rights campaigners. The media generally presents a very positive image of Buddhism, the Dalai Lama is hailed as a modern saint, and an idealized image of Tibet before the Chinese take over is given. However, it is worth examining what sort of place Tibet was before the Chinese intervention, who benefited and who lost from it, and who the people campaigning for ‘free Tibet’ are (1).

In Tibet, prior to the Chinese take over, theocratic despotism had been the rule for generations. An English visitor to Tibet in 1895, Dr. A. L. Waddell, wrote that the Tibetan people were under the “intolerable tyranny of monks” and the devil superstitions they had fashioned to terrorize the people. In 1904 Perceval Landon described the Dalai Lama’s rule as “an engine of oppression” and “a barrier to all human improvement.” At about that time, another English traveler, Captain W.F.T. O’Connor, observed that “the great landowners and the priests . . . exercise each in their own dominion a despotic power from which there is no appeal,” while the people are “oppressed by the most monstrous growth of monasticism and priest-craft the world has ever seen.” Tibetan rulers, like those of Europe during the Middle Ages, “forged innumerable weapons of servitude, invented degrading legends and stimulated a spirit of superstition” among the common people (Stuart Gelder and Roma Gelder, The Timely Rain: Travels in New Tibet, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964, 123-125). In Tibet, slavery was the rule.

The following account was written by Sir Charles Bell, who was the British administrator for Chumbi Valley in 1904-05: “‘Slaves were sometimes stolen, when small children, from their parents. Or the father and mother, being too poor to support their child, would sell it to a man, who paid them _sho-ring_, “price of mother’s milk,” brought up the child and kept it, or sold it, as a slave. These children come mostly from south-eastern Tibet and the territories of the wild tribes who dwell between Tibet and Assam.’ (Charles Bell, Tibet: Past and Present, Oxford, 1924, pp. 78-79. Taken from http://www.faqs.org/faqs/tibet-faq)

In 1953, six years before the Chinese takeover, the greater part of the rural population (some 700,000 of an estimated total population of 1,250,000) were serfs. Serfs and other peasants generally received no schooling or medical care. They spent most of their time working for the monasteries and high-ranking lamas, or for a secular aristocracy that numbered not more than 200 families. They were in practice owned by their masters who told them what crops to grow and what animals to raise. They could not get married without the consent of their lord or lama. A serf might easily be separated from his family should the owner send him to work in a distant location. Serfs could be sold by their masters, or subjected to torture and death (for more details see http://www.michaelparenti.org/Tibet.html).

Whatever wrongs and new oppressions introduced by the Chinese in Tibet after 1959, they did abolish slavery and the serfdom system of unpaid labor. They started work projects, and greatly reduced unemployment and beggary. They built the only hospitals that exist in the country, and established secular education, thereby breaking the educational monopoly of the monasteries. They constructed running water and electrical systems in Lhasa. They also put an end to floggings, mutilations, and amputations as a form of criminal punishment under Buddhist rule. Chinese rule in Tibet has often been brutal, however its extent has often been exaggerated.

The accusations made by the Dalai Lama himself about Chinese mass sterilization and forced deportation of Tibetans, for example, have remained unsupported by any evidence. Both the Dalai Lama and his advisor and youngest brother, Tendzin Choegyal, claimed that more than 1.2 million Tibetans are dead as a result of the Chinese occupation. This figure is more than dubious. The official 1953 census, six years before the Chinese take over, recorded the entire population of Tibet at 1,274,000. Other estimates varied from one to three million. Other census counts put the ethnic Tibetan population within the country at about two million (Pradyumna P. Karan, The Changing Face of Tibet: The Impact of Chinese Communist Ideology on the Landscape, Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1976, 52-53). If the Chinese killed 1.2 million then entire cities and huge portions of the countryside, indeed almost all of Tibet, would have been depopulated – something for which there is no evidence. The Chinese military force in Tibet was not large enough to round up, chase, and exterminate that many people even if it had spent all its time doing this.

It is worth examining who is behind the ‘Free Tibet’ movement. The former elites lost many of their privileges due to the Chinese takeover. The family of the Dalai Lama lost no fewer than 4000 slaves! It is thus not surprising that feudal lords should campaign against the social gains of Maoism. Their campaign has found an international echo thanks to the CIA. Throughout the 1960s the Tibetan exile community received $1.7 million a year from the CIA, according to documents released by the State Department in 1998. The Dalai Lama’s organization itself admits that it had received millions of dollars from the CIA during the 1960s to send armed squads of exiles into Tibet to undermine the Maoist revolution. The Dalai Lama’s annual share was $186,000, making him a paid agent of the CIA. Indian intelligence also financed him and other Tibetan exiles (Jim Mann, “CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in ’60s, Files Show,” Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1998; and New York Times, 1 October, 1998). Today, mostly through the National Endowment for Democracy and other conduits that are more respectable-sounding than the CIA, the US Congress continues to allocate an annual $2 million to Tibetans in India, with additional millions for “democracy activities” within the Tibetan exile community (See Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2002, for example).

Also, while presenting himself as a defender of human rights, the Dalai Lama supports more than dubious causes. For example, in April 1999, along with Margaret Thatcher and George Bush senior, the Dalai Lama called upon the British government to release Augusto Pinochet.

While Chinese rule is resented by many in Tibet, people are also afraid to loose the social gains of Maoism. A 1999 story in the Washington Post notes that the Dalai Lama continues to be revered in Tibet, but “few Tibetans would welcome a return of the corrupt aristocratic clans that fled with him in 1959 and that comprise the bulk of his advisers. Many Tibetan farmers, for example, have no interest in surrendering the land they gained during China’s land reform to the clans. Tibet’s former slaves say they, too, don’t want their former masters to return to power. “I’ve already lived that life once before,” said Wangchuk, a 67-year-old former slave who was wearing his best clothes for his yearly pilgrimage to Shigatse, one of the holiest sites of Tibetan Buddhism. He said he worshipped the Dalai Lama, but added, “I may not be free under Chinese communism, but I am better off than when I was a slave.” (John Pomfret, “Tibet Caught in China’s Web,” Washington Post, 23 July 1999)

Just one note I want to point out.

Illegal border crossing does take place amongst Tibetans. Passports are not for everyone in China, and it might be harder to get for Tibetans. The main reason is financial. The cost for getting a passport is not affordable by all, not to mention extra costs in paying corrupting officials. Therefore, some Tibetans do cross the border illegally despite the harsh physical conditions and risk of intervention by border patrol. Some of them go to India in hope for education in English and better living conditions, and some return to China when they cannot find a job or make a good living there. I got this information by talking with 2 Tibetans in May 2007, both of them had studied in Dharamsala and then returned to Tibet.

It would be hard to verify only from the video footage who the people being shot at the border were and for what intention they were going to India. But if they were breaking the law I find it justified for border patrol to uphold law and order – though the means and degree of violence warrant scrutiny.

Just wonder what would Israeli patrol do if Pakistaneans cross their checkpoints illegally, or US if they find Mexicans sneaking into US border.

Scholar tells skeptical audience that claims by Tibetan exiles of Chinese cultural discrimination are greatly exaggerated.

By Leslie Evans

Barry Sautman, Associate Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, spoke at UCLA December 2 to defend the thesis that claims of cultural repression against Tibetans by the Han Chinese are greatly exaggerated by Tibetan exiles in India and by the liberal Western press. His talk was met with some skepticism from discussant Nancy Levine (Anthropology, UCLA) and by some members of the audience, but he presented a wide range of data to support his view. The talk was sponsored by the Center for Chinese Studies.

Sautman chose to focus his presentation on a refutation of the claims made by some Tibetan exiles that the Chinese are pursuing a policy of “cultural genocide” in Tibet. Levine suggested that this was a bit of a straw man and that most exiles are concerned more with issues of lagging development. On specific issues Sautman made the following case.

Rival Views on Tibetan Sovereignty

The Chinese government and the Tibetan exiles in India, led by the Dalai Lama, have diametrically opposed views of the rights of Tibetans to independence. The Chinese claim that Tibet was a Chinese province for eight centuries and that the Dalai Lama has forfeited his spiritual and temporal leadership because he is a separatist. The Tibetans in exile call Tibet a colony of China. This view, Sautman said, “Is widely accepted in the West. It has resonance in the West in the post-Holocaust period.” In contrast, he argued, “The problems of Tibetans are typical of minorities in the era of large modern states.”

It is true, he said, that there have been significant inroads of Chinese culture into Tibet since the forcible takeover in 1959, but there has been an even greater influx of Western culture. “By not defining cultural genocide the Tibetan exiles can label any changes from 1959 as cultural genocide, although many of these changes could be expected to have occurred without the issue of cultural genocide arising.”

The most common specific charges raised by Tibetan exiles, Sautman said, “point to Han immigration plus restrictive birth policies. In fact the state sponsored transfer to Tibet is on a small scale. From 1994 to 2001 the PRC organized only a few thousand people to go to Tibet as cadres. Most serve only 3 years and then return to China. Those who move on their own to the Tibet Autonomous Region usually return to China in a few years. They come for a while, find the cities of Tibet too expensive, and then return to China. Some of the 72,000 Chinese who maintain their hukou [household registration] in Tibet don’t really live there. Pensions are higher if your household is registered in Tibet. These facts are supported by Australian and U.S. demographers. Claims of ethnic swamping in Tibet are misleading.”

Chinese Policies on Tibetan Birth Rates

The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Soutman said, “encourages Tibetans to limit their families to 3 children. The local government townships have the power to impose small fines for more than 3 children. One study showed that in 3 of 4 studied townships no fine was imposed on a birth issue and only very small fines in the fourth. Tibetan families in Tibet average 3.8 children, larger than Tibetan families in India. Han families with more than one child face much harsher penalties. In 1990 Tibetans were 95% of the Tibetan population. There has been no dramatic change in the region’s ethnic balance.”

Exiles also claim that birth policies are repressive against Tibetans in regions of China proper where they are significant minorities, such as in Qinghai and Gansu. “This is not sustained by available statistics,” Sautman insisted. “The percent of Tibetans in Qinghai has shown no significant change from 1950 to 2000. Restriction on family size is harsher for the majority than for the minority and the effects have not changed the percent of Tibetans in the Qinghai population. This is hardly cultural genocide.”

Émigrés complain of restrictions on the minimum age of monks and nuns and on affiliation with the Dalai Lama. Sautman countered by saying that China claims there are more than 2,000 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. “I have visited many of these and they are all active religious communities. The Chinese government in the remote far west actually encourages people to join monasteries to have people to take care of ethnic relics.”

Sautman said that there is now 1 monk or nun for every 35 Tibetans, “the highest of any Buddhist country in the world, and much higher than the relation of ministers and priests to parishioners in any Christian country in the world, where the ratio is often 1 to 1,000. Chinese law says you have to be 18 to become a monk, but in practice there are often much younger monks.”

Status of the Tibetan Language

Sautman also sought to rebut charges by Tibetan exiles that the Tibetan language is devalued and being replaced by Chinese. “92-94% of ethnic Tibetans speak Tibetan. The only exception is places in Qinghai and Amdo where the Tibetan population is very small compared with the broader population. Instruction in primary school is pretty universally in Tibetan. Chinese is bilingual from secondary school onward. All middle schools in the TAR also teach Tibetan. In Lhasa there are about equal time given to Chinese, Tibetan, and English.” In contrast, Soutman said, “Tibetan exile leaders in India used English as the sole language until 1994 and only became bilingual in 1994. Schools in Tibet promote the Tibetan language more than Indian schools do in ethnic Tibetan areas–in Ladakh, India, instruction is in Urdu, with a high dropout rate from Tibetans, but India is never accused of cultural genocide against Tibetans.”

There is an upsurge of the performing arts, poetry and painting by Tibetans, Sautman told the audience. “The exile leaders claim that the Chinese officials suppress Tibetan themes. In exile the Tibetan arts often introduce non-Tibetan themes, but there is no accusation of cultural genocide. Vices such as prostitution are not unique to Tibet under Chinese rule but are common throughout Buddhist lands. There are few aspects of Chinese culture in Tibet, but there are many aspects of Western culture, such as jeans, disco music, etc. The exile Tibetans do not condemn the growth of Western influence at the expense of traditional Tibetan culture.”

A Discussant Demurs

Discussant Nancy Levine said it was her opinion that cultural genocide was not a central focus of exile literature. “The discussion seems to focus on social and economic marginalization. The term is problematic.” She conceded that Sautman’s paper contained “some strong evidence,” but said he cited dubious sources as well.

“You criticize the government in exile’s position that a fifth of the population was eliminated by purges from the 1959 and 1979. It appears that there was a powerful impact of the Great Leap Forward. Some areas such as the Tibetan areas of Sichuan lost as much as half of their Tibetan population during the Great Leap Forward. There were serious population losses. It should not be simply denied. It is true that the Tibetan population since the 1960s has been growing rapidly and that birth control has been fairly loose for Tibetans. The basis for fines varies sharply. The one study you site at Lhasa cannot be generalized.”

On Tibetan Buddhism, she said, “There were 10,000 monks in 1959, and while there are many today, it is a radical decline from then, plus a radical discontinuity in religious training of monks. In 2000 Kirti [Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Sichuan province] was dissolved, with 2,000 monks. The practice of Buddhism is seriously constrained. Every major leader of Tibetan Buddhism except the Panchen Lama is in exile today, not only the Dalai Lama.”

Levine scored Sautman for relying too much on Chinese journalistic sources. “You use a Xinhua news source to claim that there are 300 more Tibetan religious institutions today than in 1959. I have been misquoted by Xinhua and this is not a reliable figure. You do have some strong data, but you should distinguish it better from some more questionable sources that you also use.”

Barry Sautman responded on several fronts. On claimed declines in Tibetan population, he cited articles in the Columbia Journal of Asian Law and by an Australian Chinese demographer in Asian Ethnicity in 2000. “What I think these articles show is that there is no evidence of significant population losses over the whole period from the 1950s to the present. There are some losses during he Great Leap Forward but these were less in Tibetan areas than in other parts of China. Where these were serious were in Sichuan and Qinghai, but even there not as serious in the Han areas of China. There are no bases at all for the figures used regularly by the exile groups. They use the figure of 1.2 million Tibetans dying from the 1950s to the 1970s, but no source for this is given. As a lawyer I give no credence to statistics for which there is no data, no visible basis.”

Sautman conceded Levine’s point that claims of cultural genocide are not prominent in Tibetan exile literature, “But pushing the button of genocide has a bigger impact than pushing the button of underdevelopment.” He denied that either the local or national Chinese government discriminates against Tibetans: “My finding is that discrimination is popular, but it comes from Han prejudice. The state in Tibetan areas does not involve itself in acts of discrimination. In part this is because many of the leaders in the ethnic minority areas are from the ethnic minority.”

source at http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=2732

Recent protests in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas were organized to embarrass the Chinese government ahead of the Olympics. The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), the major Tibetan exile organization that advocates independence for Tibet and has endorsed using violent methods to achieve it, has said as much. Its head, Tsewang Rigzin, stated in a March 15 interview with the Chicago Tribune that since it is likely that Chinese authorities would suppress protests in Tibet, “With the spotlight on them with the Olympics, we want to test them. We want them to show their true colors. That’s why we’re pushing this.” At the June, 2007 Conference for an Independent Tibet organized in India by “Friends of Tibet,” speakers pointed out that the Olympics present a unique opportunity for protests in Tibet. In January, 2008, exiles in India launched a “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” to “act in the spirit” of the violent 1959 uprising against Chinese government authority and focus on the Olympics.

Several groups of Tibetans were likely involved in the protests in Lhasa, including in the burning and looting of non-Tibetan businesses and attacks against Han and Hui (Muslim Chinese) migrants to Tibet. The large monasteries have long been centers of separatism, a stance cultivated by the TYC and other exile entities, many of which are financed by the US State Department or the US Congress’ National Endowment for Democracy. Monks are self-selected to be especially devoted to the Dalai Lama. However much he may characterize his own position as seeking only greater autonomy for Tibet, monks know he is unwilling to declare that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, an act China demands of him as a precondition to formal negotiations. Because the exile regime eschews a separation of politics and religion, many monks deem adherence to the Dalai Lama’s stance of non-recognition of the Chinese government’s legitimacy in Tibet to be a religious obligation.

Reports on the violence have underscored that Tibetan merchants competing with Han and Hui are especially antagonistic to the presence of non-Tibetans. Alongside monks, Tibetan merchants were the mainstay of protests in Lhasa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This time around, many Han and Hui-owned shops were torched. Many of those involved in arson, looting, and ethnic-based beatings are also likely to have been unemployed young men. Towns have experienced much rural-to-urban migration of Tibetans with few skills needed for urban employment. Videos from Lhasa showed the vast majority of rioters were males in their teens or twenties.

The recent actions in Tibetan areas differ from the broad-based demonstrations of “people power” movements in several parts of the world in the last few decades. They hardly show the overwhelming Tibetan anti-Chinese consensus portrayed in the international media. The highest media estimate of Tibetans who participated in protests is 20,000 — by Steve Chao
, the Beijing Bureau Chief of Canadian Television News, i.e. one of every 300 Tibetans. Compare that to the 1986 protests against the Marcos dictatorship by about three million — one out of every 19 Filipinos.

Tibetans have legitimate grievances about not being sufficiently helped to compete for jobs and in business with migrants to Tibet. There is also job discrimination by Han migrants in favor of family members and people from their native places. The gaps in education and living standards between Tibetans and Han are substantial and too slow in narrowing. The grievances have long existed, but protests and rioting took place this year because the
Olympics make it opportune for separatists to advance their agenda. Indeed, there was a radical disconnect between Tibetan socio-economic grievances and the slogans raised in the protests, such as “Complete Independence for Tibet” and “May the exiles and Tibetans inside Tibet be reunited,” slogans that not coincidentally replicate those raised by pro-independence Tibetan exiles.

While separatists will not succeed in detaching Tibet from China by rioting, they believe that China will eventually collapse, like the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and they seek to establish their claim to rule before that happens. Alternatively, they think that the United States may intervene, as it has elsewhere, to foster the breakaway of regions in countries to
which the US is antagonistic, e.g. Kosovo and southern Sudan. The Chinese government also fears such eventualities, however unlikely they are to come to pass. It accordingly acts to suppress separatism, an action that comports with its rights under international law.

Separatists know they can count on the automatic sympathy of Western politicians and media, who view China as a strategic economic and political competitor. Western elites have thus widely condemned China for suppressing riots that these elites would never allow to go unsuppressed in their own countries. They demand that China be restrained in its response; yet, during the Los Angeles uprising or riots of 1992 — which spread to a score of
other major cities — President George H.W. Bush stated when he sent in thousands of soldiers, that “There can be no excuse for the murder, arson, theft or vandalism that have terrorized the people of Los Angeles . . . Let me assure you that I will use whatever force is necessary to restore order.” Neither Western politicians nor mainstream media attacked him on this score, while neither Western leaders nor the Dalai Lama have criticized those Tibetans who recently engaged in ethnic-based attacks and arson.

Western elites give the Chinese government no recognition for significant improvements in the lives of Tibetans as a result of subsidies from the China’s central government and provinces, improvements that the Dalai Lama has himself admitted. Western politicians and media also consistently credit the Dalai Lama’s charge that “cultural genocide” is underway in Tibet,
even though the exiles and their supporters offer no credible evidence of the evisceration of Tibetan language use, religious practice or art. In fact, more than 90% of Tibetans speak Tibetan as their mother tongue. Tibet has about 150,000 monks and nuns, the highest concentration of full-time “clergy” in the Buddhist world. Western scholars of Tibetan literature and art forms have attested that it is flourishing.

Ethnic contradictions in Tibet arise from the demography, economy and politics of the Tibetan areas. Separatists and their supporters claim that Han Chinese have been “flooding” into Tibet, “swamping” Tibetans demographically. In fact, between the national censuses of 1990 and 2000 (which count everyone who has lived in an area for six months or more), the
percentage of Tibetans in the Tibetan areas as a whole increased somewhat and Han were about one-fifth of the population. A preliminary analysis of the 2005 mini-census shows that from 2000-2005 there was a small increase in the proportion of Han in the central-western parts of Tibet (the Tibet Autonomous Region or TAR) and little change in eastern Tibet. Pro-
independence forces want the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han (as happened in 1912 and 1949); the Dalai Lama has said he will accept a three-to-one Tibetan to non-Tibet population ratio, but he consistently misrepresents the present situation as one of a Han majority. Given his status as not merely the top Tibetan Buddhist religious leader, but as an emanation of Buddha, most Tibetans credit whatever he says on this or other topics.

The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has very few non-Tibetans. The vast majority of Han migrants to Tibetan towns are poor or near-poor. They are not personally subsidized by the state; although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who
migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to prosper.

Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because those who cannot find work leave. Many Han migrants have racist attitudes toward Tibetans, mostly notions that Tibetans are lazy, dirty, and obsessed
with religion. Many Tibetans reciprocate with representations of Han as rich, money-obsessed and conspiring to exploit Tibetans. Long-resident urban Tibetans absorb aspects of Han culture in much the same way that ethnic minorities do with ethnic majority cultures the world over. Tibetans are not however being forcibly “Sincized.” Most Tibetans speak little or no Chinese. They begin to learn it in the higher primary grades and, in many Tibetan areas, must study in it if they go on to secondary education. Chinese, however, is one of the two most important languages in the world and considerable advantages accrue to those who learn it, just as they do to non-native English speakers.

The Tibetan exiles argue that religious practice is sharply restricted in Tibetan areas. The Chinese government has the right under international law to regulate religious institutions to prevent them from being used as vehicles for separatism and the control of religion is in fact mostly a function of the state’s (overly-developed) concern about separatism and secondarily about how the hyper-development of religious institutions counteracts “development” among ethnic Tibetans. Certain state policies do infringe on freedom of religion; for example, the forbidding, in the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region), of state employees and university students to participate in religious rites. The lesser degree of control over religion in the eastern Tibetan areas beyond the TAR– at least before the events of March, 2008 — indicate however that the Chinese government calibrates its control according to the perceived degree of separatist sentiment in the monasteries.

The Dalai Lama’s regime was of course itself a theocracy that closely regulated the monasteries, including the politics, hierarchy and number of monks. The exile authorities today circumscribe by fiat those religious practices they oppose, such as the propitiation of a “deity” known as Dorje Shugden. The cult of the Dalai Lama, which is even stronger among monks than it is among Hollywood stars, nevertheless mandates acceptance of his claim that restrictions on religious management and practice in Tibet arise solely from the Chinese state’s supposed anti-religious animus. Similarly, the cult requires the conviction that the Dalai Lama is a pacifist, even though he has explicitly or implicitly endorsed all wars waged by the US.

The Dalai Lama is a Tibetan ethnic nationalist whose worldview is — in US terms — both liberal and conservative. He and many of his foreign supporters have a pronounced affinity for conservative politicians, such as Bush, Thatcher, Lee Teng-hui and Ishihara Shintaro, but they can get along well with liberals like US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, because they are virulently anti-communist and anti-China.

The Dalai Lama is far from being a supporter of oppressed peoples. For example, in 2002, when he visited Australia, the Dalai Lama, upon arriving in Melbourne, noted “he had flown over ‘a large empty area’ of Australia that could house millions of people from other densely populated continents.” The area is, of course, not wholly empty, as it contains Aborigines. To them, the Dalai Lama proffered the advice that “black people ‘should appreciate what white people have brought to this country, its development.’” (R. Callick, “Dalai Lama Treads Fine Line,” Australian Financial Review, May 22, 2002).

The development of the “market economy” has had much the same effect in Tibetan areas as in the rest of China, i.e. increased exploitation, exacerbated income and wealth differentials, and rampant corruption. The degree to which this involves an “ethnic division of labor” that
disadvantages Tibetans is however exaggerated by separatists in order to foster ethnic antagonism. For example, Tibet is not the poorest area of China, as is often claimed. It is better off than several other ethnic minority areas and even than some Han areas, in large measure due to heavy government subsidies. Rural Tibetans as well receive more state subsidies than other minorities. The exile leaders employ hyperbole not only in terms of the degree of empirical difference, but also concerning the more fundamental ethnic relationship in Tibet: in contrast to, say, Israel/Palestine, Tibetans have the same rights as Han, they enjoy certain preferential economic and social policies, and about half the top party leaders in the TAR have been ethnic Tibetans.

Tibet has none of the indicia of a colony or occupied territory and thus has no relationship to self-determination, a concept that in recent decades has often been misused, especially by the US, to foster the breakup of states and consequent emiseration of their populations. A settlement between the Chinese government and Tibetan exile elites is a pre-condition for the
mitigation of Tibetan grievances because absent a settlement, ethnic politics will continue to subsume every issue in Tibet, as it does for example, in Taiwan and Kosovo, where ethnic binaries are constructed by “ethnic political entrepreneurs,” who seek to outbid each other for support.

The protests in Tibet had no progressive aspect. Many who participated in the ethnic murders, beatings and arsons in Lhasa were poor rural migrants to the city, but the slogans there and elsewhere in Tibet almost all concerned independence or the Dalai Lama. There have been many movements the world over in which marginalized people have taken a reactionary and often racist road, for example, al-Qaeda or much of the base of the Nazis. The riots in Tibet also have done nothing to advance discussions of a political settlement between the Chinese government and exiles, yet a settlement is necessary for the substantial mitigation of Tibetan grievances. For Tibetan pro-independence forces, a setback to such efforts may have been their very purpose in fostering the riots. Tibetan pro-independence forces, like separatists everywhere, seek to counter any view of the world that is not ethnic-based and to thwart all efforts to resolve ethnic contradictions, in order to boost the mobilization needed to sustain their ethnic nationalist projects. They have claimed that China will soon collapse and the US will thereafter increase its patronage of a Tibetan state elite, to the benefit of ordinary Tibetans. One only has to look round the world at the many humanitarian catastrophes that have resulted from such thinking to project what consequences are likely to follow for ordinary Tibetans if the separatist fantasy were fulfilled.

Legally Tibetan has never been recognized by any countries as well as UN. Moreover, in the treaty between Britain and Tibet in 1913, (which was declined by the goverment of Republic of China,) Tibet was recognized as a part of China. In 1947, the nobels of Tibet visited U.S.A aiming at being regconized as an independent country but unfortunately failing the attempt as a fact.

That’s why China has never agreed that it invaded or colonised Tibet. As liberation of Tibet was consided a part of civil war between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. People’s Republic of China inherited the Tibet from the Republic of China according to the widely adopted Internation Law.

History of Tibet
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It has been suggested that Tibet#History of Tibet be merged into this article or section. (Discuss)

Tibet is situated between the two ancient civilizations of central China and India, but the tangled mountain ranges of the Tibetan Plateau and the towering Himalayas serve to distance it from both. The Tibetan language is a member of the Tibeto-Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Tibetan history is characterized by a special dedication to the Buddhist religion, both in the eyes of its own people as well as for the Mongol and Manchu peoples. Tibet is nicknamed “the roof of the world” or “the land of snows”.
Contents
[hide]

* 1 Prehistory
o 1.1 Archaeological record
o 1.2 Mythological origins
* 2 Early History
o 2.1 Founding of the dynasty
* 3 Tibetan Empire
o 3.1 Reign of Songtsän Gampo
o 3.2 Reign of Mangsong Mangtsen (650-676)
o 3.3 Reign of ‘Dus-rong Mang-po-rje (677-704)
o 3.4 Reign of Mes-ag-tshoms (704-754)
o 3.5 Reign of Trisong Detsän (756-797 or 804)
o 3.6 Reign of Mune Tsenpo (c. 797-799?)
o 3.7 Reign of Sadnalegs (799-815)
o 3.8 Reign of Ralpacan (815-838)
o 3.9 Reign of Langdarma (838-842)
* 4 Tibet divided (842-1247)
* 5 The Mongols and the Sakya school (1236-1354)
* 6 Rise of the Phagmodru (1354-1434)
* 7 The Dalai Lama lineage
* 8 The origin of the title of ‘Dalai Lama’
* 9 Rise of the Geluk school
o 9.1 Khoshud, Dzungars, and Manchu
* 10 18th and 19th centuries
o 10.1 Removal of the Regents and establishment of the Kashag
* 11 British invasions of Tibet (1904-1911)
o 11.1 British invasion
* 12 The Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of 1913
* 13 Chinese military expelled
* 14 The Simla Convention of 1914
* 15 Rule of the Chinese Communist Government
* 16 Tibetan Government in Exile
* 17 Footnotes
* 18 Bibliography
* 19 Further reading
* 20 See also
* 21 External links

[edit] Prehistory

Construction of an early history of the Tibetan region relies primarily on ancient Chinese histories supplemented with limited archaeological findings.[1] Chinese and “proto-Tibeto-Burman” languages may have split sometime before 4000 BC. The Chinese began growing millet in the Yellow River valley and the Tibeto-Burmans remained nomads; Tibetan split from Burmese circa 500[2].

[edit] Archaeological record

Megalithic monuments dot the Tibetan Plateau and may have been used in ancestor worship. It is unknown whether these monuments were built by ancient Tibetans.[1] Prehistoric Iron Age hill forts and burial complexes have recently been found on the Tibetan plateau but the remote high altitude location makes archaeological research difficult. The earliest Tibetan historical texts identify the Zhang Zhung culture as a people who migrated from the Amdo region into Western Tibet.[1]

[edit] Mythological origins

The first Tibetan king, Nyatri Tsanpo (Wylie: Gnya’-khri-btsan-po), is supposed to have descended from the sky, or immigrated to Tibet from India. Because of his strange physical features such as having webbed hands, and eyes which close from below, he is supposed to have been greeted by the locals as a god. The king remained connected to the heavens with a rope, and rather than dying, ascended the same rope again.

The legendary King Drigum Tsenpo (Dri-gum-brtsan-po) provoked his groom Longam (Lo-ngam) to fight with him, and during the fight the King’s heaven-cord was cut, and he was killed. As a result, Drigum Tsenpo and subsequent kings left corpses and were buried.[3][4]

In a later myth, first attested in the Maṇi bka’ ‘bum, the Tibetan people are the progeny of the union of a monkey and rock ogress. The Monkey is in fact a manifestation of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (Tib. Spyan-ras-gzigs) and the ogress in fact the goddess Tara (Tib. ‘Grol-ma).[5]

[edit] Early History

The Chinese, from the 7th century CE, rendered Bod as 蕃 – pinyin: fan or bo (pronounced at that time something like p’i̭̭wǎn).[6]

“Was this because Tibetans sometimes said ‘Bon’ instead of ‘Bod’, or because ‘fan’ in Chinese was a common name for ‘barbarians’? We do not know. But before long, on the testimony of a Tibetan ambassador, the Chinese started using the form T’u-fan [吐蕃 - also transliterated in pinyin as Tubo], by assimilation with the name of the T’u-fa, a Turco-Mongol race, who must originally have been called something like Tuppat. At the same period, Turkish and Sogdian texts mention a people called ‘Tüpüt’, situated roughly in the north-east of modern Tibet. This is the form that Moslem writers have used since the ninth century (Tübbet, Tibbat, etc.). Through them it reached the mediaeval European explorers (Piano-Carpini, Rubruck, Marco Polo, Francesco della Penna).”[7]

The first externally confirmed contact with the Tibetan kingdom in recorded Tibetan history occurred when King Namri Löntsän (Gnam-ri-slon-rtsan) sent an ambassador to China in the early 7th century.[8]

[edit] Founding of the dynasty

Tibet began at the castle named Taktsé (Stag-rtse) in the Chingba (Phying-ba) district of Chonggyä (Phyongs-rgyas). There, According to the Old Tibetan Chronicle

“A group of conspirators convinced Stag-bu snya-gzigs [Tagbu Nyazig] to rebel against Dgu-gri Zing-po-rje [Gudri Zingpoje]. Zing-po-rje was in turn a vassal of the Zhang-zhung empire under the Lig myi dynasty. Zing-po-rje died before the conspiracy could get underway, and his son Gnam-ri-slon-mtshan [Namri Löntsen] instead led the conspiracy after extracting an oath of fealty from the conspirators.”[9]

The group prevailed against Zing-po-rje. At this point Namri Songtsen (Namri Löntsän) was the leader of a fledgling clan which prevailed over all his neighboring clans, one by one, to finally control all the area around what is now Lhasa by 630, when he was assassinated. This new-born regional state would become the Tibetan Empire. The government of Namri Songtsen sent two embassies to China in 608 and 609, marking the appearance of Tibet on the international scene.[10]

[edit] Tibetan Empire
Map of Tibetan Empire in 820 in relation to other significant powers
Map of Tibetan Empire in 820 in relation to other significant powers

As has been noted, traditional Tibetan history preserves a lengthy list of rulers, whose exploits become subject to external verification by the seventh century. From the 7th to the 11th century a series of emperors ruled Tibet – see List of emperors of Tibet. Throughout the centuries from the time of the emperor Songtsän Gampo the power of the empire gradually increased over a diverse terrain so that by the reign of the emperor Ralpacan in the opening years of the ninth century its influence extended as far south as Bengal and as far north as Mongolia.

The varied terrain of the empire and the difficulty of transportation, coupled with the new ideas that came into the empire as a result of its expansion, helped to create stresses and power blocs that were often in competition with the ruler at the center of the empire. Thus, for example, adherents of the Bon religion and the supporters of the ancient noble families gradually came to find themselves in competition with the recently-introduced Buddhism.

[edit] Reign of Songtsän Gampo

Songtsän Gampo (Wylie: Srong-brtsan Sgam-po) (born ca. 604, died 650) was the great emperor who expanded Tibet’s power, and is traditionally credited with inviting Buddhism to Tibet. When his father, Namri Löntsän died by poisoning, circa 618,[11] Songtsän Gampo took control, after putting down a brief rebellion.
A statue of Emperor Songtsän Gampo in a cave at Yerpa
A statue of Emperor Songtsän Gampo in a cave at Yerpa

Songtsän Gampo proved adept at diplomacy, as well as in combat. The emperor’s minister Myang Mangpoje (Wylie: Myang Mang-po-rje Zhang-shang) defeated Sumpa ca. 627.[12] Six years later (c. 632-3) Myang Mangpoje was accused of treason and executed.[13][14][15] He was succeeded by minister Gar Songtsän (Mgar-srong-rtsan).

The Chinese records mention an envoy in 634. On that occasion, the Emperor requested marriage to a Chinese princess and was refused. In 635-6 the Emperor attacked and defeated the Azha (Tibetan: ‘A zha; Chinese: Tüyühün) people, who lived around Lake Koko Nur in the northeast corner of Tibet, and who controlled important trade routes into China. After a Tibetan campaign against China in 635-6,[16] the Chinese emperor agreed to provide a Chinese princess to Songtsän Gampo.

Circa 639, after Songtsän Gampo had a dispute with his younger brother Tsänsong (Brtsan-srong), the younger brother was burnt to death by his own minister Khäsreg (Mkha’s sregs) (presumably at the behest of his older brother the emperor).[14][17]

The Chinese princess Wencheng (Tibetan Mung-chang Kung-co) departed China in 640 to marry Songtsän Gampo. She arrived a year later. Peace between China and Tibet prevailed for the remainder of Songtsän Gampo’s reign.

Songtsän Gampo’s sister Sämakar (Sad-mar-kar) was sent to marry Lig-myi-rhya, the king of Zhang Zhung. However, when the king refused to consummate the marriage, she then helped her brother to defeat Lig myi-rhya and incorporate Zhang Zhung into the Tibetan Empire.

In 645, Songtsän Gampo overran the kingdom of Zhang Zhung in what is now Western Tibet.

Songtsän Gampo died in 650. He was succeeded by his infant grandson Trimang Lön (Khri-mang-slon). Real power was left in the hands of the minister Gar Songtsän.

[edit] Reign of Mangsong Mangtsen (650-676)

The minister Gar Songtsän died in 667, after having incorporated Azha into Tibetan territory. Between 665-670 Kotan was defeated by the Tibetans, and a long string of conflicts with the Chinese T’ang Dynasty over territories in the Tarim Basin began in 670 and lasted until 692.[18] Emperor Mangsong Mangtsen (Trimang Löntsen or Khri-mang-slon-rtsan) married Thrimalö (Khri-ma-lod), a woman who would be of great importance in Tibetan history. The emperor died in the winter of 676-677, and Zhang Zhung revolts thereafter. In the same year the emperor’s son, ‘Dus-rong Mang-po-rje (Tridu Songtsän or Khri-’dus-srong-rtsan), was born.[9]

[edit] Reign of ‘Dus-rong Mang-po-rje (677-704)
Tibet’s Empire in 700 AD.
Tibet’s Empire in 700 AD.

Emperor ‘Dus-rong Mang-po-rje or Tridu Songtsän ruled in the shadow of his powerful mother Thrimalö on the one hand and the influential Gar (Mgar) clan on the other hand. In 685, the minister, Gar Tännyädombu (Mgar Bstan-snyas-ldom-bu) died and his brother, Gar Thridringtsändrö (Mgar Khri-‘bring-btsan brod) was appointed to replace him.[19] In 692, the Tibetans lost the Tarim Basin to the Chinese. Gar Thridringtsändrö defeated the Chinese in battle in 696, and sued for peace. Two years later in 698 emperor Tridu Songtsän invited the Gar clan (over 2000 people) to a hunting party and had them executed. Gar Thridringtsändrö then committed suicide, and his troops loyal to him joined the Chinese. This brought to end the power of the Gar family.[9]

From 700 until his death the emperor remained on campaign in the north-east, absent from Central Tibet, while his mother Thrimalö administrated in his name.[20] In 702 China and Tibet concluded peace. At the end of that year, the Tibetan imperial government turned to consolidating the administrative organization (Tibetan: khö chenpo; Wylie: mkhos chen-po) of the northeastern Sumru (Wylie: Sum-ru) area, which had been the Sumpa country conquered 75 years earlier. Sumru was organized as a new “horn” of the empire. During the summer of 703, Tridu Songtsän resided at Öljag (‘Ol-byag) in Ling (Gling), which was on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, before proceeding with an invasion of Jang (‘Jang) or Nan-chao. In 704, he stayed briefly at Yoti Chuzang (Yo-ti Chu-bzangs) in Madrom (Rma-sgrom) on the Yellow River. He then invaded Mywa (probably = the Miao people)[21] but died during the prosecution of that campaign.[20]

[edit] Reign of Mes-ag-tshoms (704-754)

Gyältsugru (Wylie: Rgyal-gtsug-ru), later to become King Tride Tsuktsän (Khri-lde-gtsug-brtsan), generally known now by his nickname Mes-ag-tshoms (“Old Hairy”), was born in 704. Upon the death of ‘Dus-rong Mang-po-rje (Tridu Songtsen), his wife Thrimalö ruled as regent for the infant Gyältsugru.[20] The following year the elder son of Tridu Songtsen, by the name of Lha Balpo (Lha Bal-pho) apparently contested the succession of his one-year-old brother but, at Pong Lag-rang, Lha Balpo was “deposed from the throne”.[20][22]

Thrimalö had arranged for a royal marriage to a Chinese princess. The Princess Jincheng (金成) (Tibetan: Kyimshang Kongjo) arrived in 710, but it is somewhat unclear whether she married the seven year old Gyältsugru[23], or the deposed Lha Balpo.[24] He also married a lady from Jang (Nanzhao) and another born in Nanam.[25]

Gyältsugru was officially enthroned with the royal name Tride Tsuktsän in 712,[20] the same year that dowager emperess Thrimalö died.

The Arabs and Turgis became increasingly prominent during 710-720. The Tibetans were allied with the Arabs and eastern Turks. Tibet and China fought on and off in the late 720s. At first Tibet (with Turgis allies) had the upper hand, but then started losing battles. After a rebellion in southern China, and a major Tibetan victory in 730, the Tibetans and Turgis sued for peace.

In 734 the Tibetans married their princess Dronmalön (‘Dron ma lon) to the Turgis Qaghan. The Chinese allied with the Arabs to attack the Turgis. After victory and peace with the Turgis, the Chinese attacked the Tibet army. The Tibetans suffered several defeats in the east, despite strength in the west. The Turgis empire collapsed from internal strife. In 737, the Tibetans launched an attack against the king of Bru-za (Gilgit), who asked for Chinese help, but was ultimately forced to pay homage to Tibet. In 747, the hold of Tibet was loosened by the campaign of general Gao Xianzhi, who tried to re-open the direct communications between Central Asia and Kashmir. By 750 the Tibetans had lost almost all of their central Asian colonial possessions to the Chinese. In 753, even the kingdom of Little Balur (Gilgit) was captured by the Chinese.

In 755 Tride Tsuktsän was killed by the ministers Lang and Bal. Then Tagdra Lukong (Stag-sgra Klu-khong) presented evidence to prince Song Detsän (Srong-lde-brtsan) that “they were disloyal”, were causing dissension in the country, and were about to injure him also. … Subsequently, Lang and ‘Bal really did revolt, they were killed by the army, their property was confiscated, and Klu khong was, one assumes, richly rewarded.”[26]

[edit] Reign of Trisong Detsän (756-797 or 804)

In 756, Prince Song Detsän was crowned Emperor with the name Trisong Detsän (Wylie Khri sron lde brtsan) and took control of the government when he attained his majority[27] at 13 years of age (14 by Western reckoning) after a one-year interregnum during which there was no emperor. In 755 China had been greatly weakened by internal rebellion, which would last until 763. In contrast, Trisong Detsän’s reign was characterized by the reassertion of Tibetan influence in Central Asia and against China. Early in his reign regions to the West of Tibet paid homage to the Tibetan court. From that time onward the Tibetans pressed into the territory of the Tang emperors, reaching the Chinese capital Chang’an (modern Xian) by 763/764. Tibetan troops occupied Chang’an for fifteen days and installed a puppet emperor while Emperor Daizong of Tang was in Luoyang. Nanzhao (in Yunnan and neighbouring regions) remained under Tibetan control from 750 to 794, when they turned on their Tibetan overlords and helped the Chinese inflict a serious defeat on the Tibetans.[28]

In the meantime, the Kyrgyz negotiated an agreement of friendship with Tibet and other powers to allow free trade in the region. An attempt at a peace treaty between Tibet and China was made in 787, but hostilities were to last until the Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821 was inscribed in Lhasa in 823 (see below). At the same time, the Uyghurs, nominal allies of the Tang emperors, continued to make difficulties along Tibet’s Northern border. Toward the end of this king’s reign, in fact, Uyghur victories in the North caused the Tibetans to lose a number of their allies in the Southeast.[29]

Recent historical research indicates the presence of Christianity in as early as the sixth and seventh centuries, a period when the White Huns had extensive links with the Tibetans.[30] A strong presence existed by the eighth century when Patriarch Timothy I (727-823) in 782 calls the Tibetans one of the more significant communities of the eastern church and wrote of the need to appoint another bishop in ca. 794.[31]

[edit] Reign of Mune Tsenpo (c. 797-799?)

The reign of Mune Tsenpo (Wylie Mu ne btsanpo) is scantily recorded.

[edit] Reign of Sadnalegs (799-815)
Tibet’s Empire in 800 AD.
Tibet’s Empire in 800 AD.

Under Tride Songtsän (Khri lde srong brtsan – generally known as Sadnalegs) there was a protracted war with Arab powers to the west. It appears that Tibetans captured a number of Arab troops and pressed them into service on the eastern frontier in 801. Tibetans were active as far west as Samarkand and Kabul. Arab forces began to gain the upper hand, and the Tibetan governor of Kabul submitted to the Arabs and became a Muslim about 812 or 815. The Arabs then struck east from Kashmir, but were held off by the Tibetans. In the meantime, the Uyghur Empire attacked Tibet from the northeast. Strife between the Uyghurs and Tibetans continued for some time.[32]

[edit] Reign of Ralpacan (815-838)

Ralpacan (Wylie Khri gtsug lde brtsan) is important to Tibetan Buddhists as one of the three Dharma Kings who brought Buddhism to Tibet. He was a generous supporter of Buddhism and invited many craftsmen, scholars and translators to Tibet from neighbouring countries. He also promoted the development of written Tibetan and translations, which were greatly aided by the development of a detailed Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicon called the Mahavyutpatti which included standard Tibetan equivalents for thousands of Sanskrit terms.[33][34]

Tibetans attacked Uyghur territory in 816 and were in turn attacked in 821. After successful Tibetan raids into Chinese territory, Buddhists in both countries sought mediation.[35] The Sino-Tibetan treaty completed in 821/822, which established peace for more than two decades.[36] A bilingual account of this treaty is inscribed on a stone pillar which stands outside the Jokhang temple in Lhasa.[37]

Ralpacan was apparently murdered by pro-Bon supporters who then placed his anti-Buddhist brother, Langdarma, on the throne.[38]

It was under the reign of Ralpacan that the political power of Tibet was at its greatest extent, stretching as far as Mongolia and Bengal, and entering into treaties with China on a mutual basis.

[edit] Reign of Langdarma (838-842)

The reign of Langdarma (Wylie Glang dar ma), whose regal title was in fact Tri Uidumtsaen (Khri ‘U’i dum brtsan), was plagued by external troubles. The Uyghur state to the north collapsed under pressure from the Kyrgyz in 840, and many displaced people fled to Tibet. Langdarma himself was assassinated, apparently by a Buddhist hermit, in 842.[39][40]

[edit] Tibet divided (842-1247)

Upon the death of Langdarma, there was a controversy over whether he would be succeeded by his alleged heir Yumtän (Wylie: Yum brtan), or by another son (or nephew) Ösung (Wylie: ‘Od-srung) (either 843-905 or 847-885). A civil war ensued, which effectively ended centralized Tibetan administration until the Sa-skya period. Ösung’s allies managed to keep control of Lhasa, and Yumtän was forced to go to Yalung, where he established a separate line of kings. [41] In 910 the tombs of the emperors were defiled.

The son of Ösung was Pälkhortsän (Wylie: Dpal ‘khor brtsan) (either 893-923 or 865-895). The latter apparently maintained control over much of central Tibet for a time, and sired two sons, Trashi Tsentsän (Wylie: Bkra shis brtsen brtsan) and Thrikhyiding (Wylie: Khri khyi lding), also called Kyide Nyigön [Wylie: Skyid lde nyi ma mgon] in some sources. Thrikhyiding emigrated to the western Tibetan region of upper Ngari (Wylie: Stod Mnga ris) and married a woman of high central Tibetan nobility, with whom he founded a local dynasty. [42]

After the breakup of the Tibetan empire in 842, Nyima-Gon, a representative of the ancient Tibetan royal house, founded the first Ladakh dynasty. Nyima-Gon’s kingdom had its centre well to the east of present-day Ladakh. Kyide Nyigön’s eldest son became ruler of the Mar-yul (Ladakh) region, and his two younger sons ruled western Tibet, founding the Kingdom of Guge and Pu-hrang. At a later period the king of Guge’s eldest son, Kor-re, also called Jangchub Yeshe Ö (Byang Chub Ye shes’ Od), became a Buddhist monk. He sent young scholars to Kashmir for training and was responsible for inviting Atisha to Tibet in 1040, thus ushering in the so called Chidar (Phyi dar) phase of Buddhism in Tibet. The younger son, Srong-nge, administered day to day governmental affairs; it was his sons who carried on the royal line. [43]

Central rule was largely nonexistent over the Tibetan region from 842 to 1247, yet Buddhism survived surreptitiously in the region of Kham. During the reign of Langdarma three monks had escaped from the troubled region of Lhasa to the region of Mt. Dantig in Amdo. Their disciple Muzu Saelbar (Mu-zu gSal-’bar), later known as the scholar Gongpa Rabsal (Dgongs-pa rab-gsal) (832-915), was responsible for the renewal of Buddhism in northeastern Tibet, and is counted as the progenitor of the Nyingma (Rnying ma pa) school of Tibetan Buddhism. Meanwhile, according to tradition, one of Ösung’s descendants, who had an estate near Samye, sent ten young men to be trained by Gongpa Rabsal. Among the ten was Lume Sherab Tshulthrim (Klu-mes Shes-rab Tshul-khrims) (950-1015). Once trained, these young men were ordained to go back into the central Tibetan regions of U and Tsang. The young scholars were able to link up with Atisha shortly after 1042 and advance the spread and organization of Buddhism in Lho-kha. In that region, the faith eventually coalesced again, with the foundation of the Sakya Monastery in 1073.[44] Over the next two centuries, the Sakya monastery grew to a position of prominence in Tibetan life and culture. The Tsurphu Monastery, home of the Karmapa sect of Buddhism, was founded in 1155.

[edit] The Mongols and the Sakya school (1236-1354)

Tibetans learned in 1207 that Genghis Khan was conquering the Tangut empire. The first documented contact between the Tibetans and the Mongols occurred when Genghis Khan met Tsangpa Dunkhurwa (Gtsang pa Dung khur ba) and six of his disciples, probably in the Tangut empire, in 1215. [45]

After the death of Genghis Khan in 1227, the Tibetans stopped sending tribute to the Mongol Empire. As a result, in 1240, the grandson of Genghis Khan and second son of Ögedei Khan, Prince Köden, invaded Tibet killing some 500 monks and destroying and looting monasteries, villages and towns. Prince Godan asked his commanders to search for an outstanding Buddhist lama and, as Sakya Pandita was considered the most religious, Godan sent a letter of “invitation” and presents to him.

It is also said that after the Mongol Köden took control of the Kokonor region in 1239, he sent his general, Doorda Darqan, on a reconnaissance mission into Tibet in 1240 to investigate the possibility of attacking Song China from the west. During this expedition the Kadampa monasteries of Rwa-sgreng and Rgyal-lha-khang were burned and 500 people were killed. The death of Ögödei the Mongol Qaghan in 1241 brought Mongol military activity around the world temporarily to a halt. Mongol interest in Tibet resumed in 1244 when Köden sent an invitation to Bengali scholar Sakya Pandit’ta, the leader of the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism, to come to his capital and formally surrender Tibet to the Mongols. Sakya Pandi’ta arrived in Kokonor with his two nephews Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (‘Phags-pa; 1235-80) and Chana Dorje (Phyag-na Rdo-rje; 1239-67) in 1246. This event marks the incorporation of Tibet into China, according to modern Chinese historians.[citation needed] However, because China was not yet conquered by the Mongols at that time, Tibetan historians argue that China and Tibet remained two separate units within the Mongol Empire.[46] It may therefore be more accurate to characterize this as first Tibet and then China being incorporated into the Mongol Empire, which became the Yuan Dynasty after Kublay Khan conquered China and created the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. In a delicate balance aimed at ruling both territories while preserving Mongol identity, Kublai Khan prohibited Mongols from marrying Chinese, but left both the Chinese and Tibetan legal and administrative systems intact.[47] Tibet never adopted the Chinese system of exams or Neo-Confucian policies.
Kublai Khan
Kublai Khan

When Möngke became Qaghan in 1251, he assigned the various districts of Tibet as appanages to his relatives. Kublai Khan was appointed by Möngke Khan to take charge over the Chinese campaigns in 1253. Since Sakya Pandit’ta had already died by this time, Kublai took Drogön Chögyal Phagpa into his camp as a symbol of Tibet’s subjugation. After the death of Sakya Pandita, Phagpa remained at the camp of Prince Godan and learned Mongolian langage. Five years later, Kublai Khan asked Godan to give him Chögyal Phagpa, who was then 23, and converted him to Buddhism. Shortly after, Kublai Khan in a succession fight, took over his brother, Möngke, and became the khan, the ruler of the Mongols and even later on became emperor of China. Kublai Khan in turn appointed Chögyal Phagpa as his Imperial Preceptor in 1260 the year when he became emperor of Mongolia. Phagpa was the first “to initiate the political theology of the relationship between state and religion in the Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhist world”.[48][49] With the support of Kublai Khan, Chögyal Phagpa established himself and his sect as the preeminent political power in Tibet.

Kublai Khan commissioned Chögyal Phagpa to design a new writing system to unify the writing of the multilingual Mongolian Empire. Chögyal Phagpa in turn modified the traditional Tibetan script and gave birth to a new set of characters called Phagspa script which was completed in 1268. Kublai Khan decided to use the Phagspa script as the official writing system of the empire, including when he became emperor of China in 1271, instead of the Chinese ideogrammes. The script was used for 110 years and is thought to have influenced the development of modern Korean script. However, it fell into disuse after the collapse of the Mongol Empire and the associated Yuan Dynasty in 1368.[50][51]

Kublai was elected Qaghan in 1260 following the death of his brother Möngke, although his title was not uncontested. At that point he named Drogön Chögyal Phagpa ’state preceptor’. In 1265 Drogön Chögyal Phagpa returned to Tibet and for the first time made an attempt to impose Sakya hegemony with the appointment of Shakya Bzang-po (a long time servant and ally of the Sakyas) as the Dpon-chen (‘great administrator’) over Tibet in 1267. A census was conducted in 1268 and Tibet was divided into thirteen myriarchies.

In 1269 Drogön Chögyal Phagpa returned to Kublai’s side at his new capital, Khanbaliq (modern day Beijing). He presented the Qaghan with a new script designed to represent all of the languages of the empire. The next year he was named Dishi (‘imperial preceptor’), and his position as ruler of Tibet (now in the form of its thirteen myriarchies) was reconfirmed. The Sakya hegemony over Tibet continued into the middle of the fourteenth century, although it was challenged by a revolt of the Drikung Kagyu sect with the assistance of Hülegü Khan of the Ilkhanate in 1285. The revolt was suppressed in 1290 when the Sa-skyas and eastern Mongols burned Drikung Monastery and killed 10,000 people.[52]

[edit] Rise of the Phagmodru (1354-1434)

Further information: Tibet during the Ming Dynasty

The Phagmodru (Phag mo gru) myriarchy centered at Neudong (Sne’u gdong) was granted as an appanage to Hülegü in 1251. The area had already been associated with the Lang (Rlang) family, and with the waning of Ilkhanate influence it was ruled by this family, within the Mongol-Sakya framework headed by the Mongol appointed Pönchen (Dpon chen) at Sakya. The areas under Lang administration were continually encroached upon during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Janchub Gyaltsän (Byang chub rgyal mtshan, 1302-1364) saw these encroachments as illegal and sought the restoration of Phagmodru lands after his appointment as the Myriarch in 1322. After prolonged legal struggles, the struggle became violent when Phagmodru was attacked by its neighbours in 1346. Jangchub Gyaltsän was arrested and released in 1347. When he later refused to appear for trial, his domains were attacked by the Pönchen in 1348. Janchung Gyaltsän was able to defend Phagmodru, and continued to have military successes, until by 1351 he was the strongest political figure in the country. Military hostilities ended in 1354 with Jangchub Gyaltsän as the unquestioned victor. He continued to rule central Tibet until his death in 1364, although he left all Mongol institutions in place as hollow formalities. Power remained in the hands of the Phagmodru family until 1434. [53]

[edit] The Dalai Lama lineage
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Altan Khan, the king of the Tümed Mongols, first invited Sonam Gyatso to Mongolia in 1569. Sonam Gyatso, the head of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism and the third Dalai Lama, apparently refused to go and sent a disciple instead, who reported back to him about the great opportunity to spread Buddhist teachings throughout Mongolia.[54]

In 1573 Altan Khan took some Tibetan Buddhist monks prisoner.[55] He invited the Sonam Gyatso to Mongolia again in 1578, and this time Sonam Gyatso accepted the invitation. They met at the site of Altan Khan’s new capital, Koko Khotan (Hohhot), and the Dalai Lama gave teachings to a huge crowd there. Altan Khan had Thegchen Chonkhor, Mongolia’s first monastery built in what is now modern Hohhot, capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.[56] Also, the ruler of the Khalkha Mongols, Abtai Sain Khan, rushed to Tumet to meet the Dalai Lama.[citation needed]

The Erdene Zuu monastery (Mongolian: Эрдэнэ Зуу) was built by Abtai in 1586, at the site of the former Mongol capital of Karakorum.[57] This was the first monastery built within the present independent nation of Mongolia.[58] and it grew into a massive establishment. In 1792, it contained sixty-two temples and some 10,000 lamas.[59]

A massive program of translating Tibetan (and Sanskrit)[60] texts into Mongolian was commenced with the letters beautifully written in silver and gold and paid for by the Dalai Lama’s Mongolian devotees. Within fifty years, virtually all Mongols had become Buddhist, with tens of thousands of monks, who were members of the Gelug order, loyal to the Dalai Lama.[61] Chinese authors sometimes insist that Altan Khan was a tributary of China, or even allude to him being a subordinate. This, however, not only ignores the often merely symbolic nature of the Chinese tributary system during the Ming and Qing dynasties (see for example a very short discussion on pp. 140ff. of J. K. Fairbank, S. Y. Tseng,On the Ch’ing tributary system, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2. (Jun., 1941), pp. 135-246), but also the fact that by the end of the 1570’s, the relations between the Ming and Altan Khan were once again marred by border raids (for this and the meeting between Altan Khan and Södnam Gyatso: Micheal Weiers, Geschichte der Mongolen, Stuttgart 2004, p. 175)

Sonam Gyatso’s message was that the time had come for Mongolia to embrace Buddhism; that from that time on there should be no more animal sacrifices; the images of the old gods were to be destroyed; there must be no taking of life, animal or human; military action must be given up; and the immolation of women on the funeral pyres of their husbands must be abolished.[62] He also secured an edict abolishing the Mongol custom of blood-sacrifices.[63]

Sonam Gyatso publicly announced that he was a reincarnation of the Tibetan Sakya monk Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (1235-1280) who converted Kublai Khan, while Altan Khan was a reincarnation of Kublai Khan (1215-1294), the famous ruler of the Mongols and Emperor of China, and that they had come together again to cooperate in propagating the Buddhist religion.[64] While this did not immediately lead to a massive conversion of Mongols to Buddhism (this would only happen in the 1630’s), it did lead to the widespread use of Buddhist ideology for the legitimation of power among the Mongol nobility. Last but not least, the Yonten Gyatso, the fourth Dalai Lama, was a grandson of Altan Khan.[65]

[edit] The origin of the title of ‘Dalai Lama’
Hayagriva (guard of the doctrines: dharmapala), fine copper, 15th-16th century
Hayagriva (guard of the doctrines: dharmapala), fine copper, 15th-16th century

It has been commonly wrongly believed that Altan Khan “bestowed” the “title” Dalai Lama on Sonam Gyatso, and placed him in a reincarnation line with Gendun Drup and Gendun Gyatso in 1578.

“More confusing in our time is that many writers have mistranslated Dalai Lama as “Ocean of Wisdom.” The full Mongolian title, “the wonderful Vajradhara, good splendid meritorious ocean,” given by Altan Khan, is primarily a translation of the Tibetan words Sonam Gyatso (sonam is “merit”).”

The 14th Dalai Lama added: “The very name of each Dalai Lama from the Second Dalai Lama onwards had the word Gyatso (in it), which means ‘ocean’ in Tibetan. Even now I am Tenzin Gyatso, so the first name is changing but the second part (the word “ocean”) became like part of each Dalai Lama’s name. All of the Dalai Lamas, since the Second, have this name. So I don’t really agree that the Mongols actually conferred a title. It was just a translation.”[66]

[edit] Rise of the Geluk school

Yonten Gyatso (1589 – 1616), the fourth Dalai Lama and a non-Tibetan, was the grandson of Altan Khan. He died in 1617 in his mid-twenties. Some people say he was poisoned but there is no real evidence one way or the other.[67]

Lobsang Gyatso (Wylie transliteration: Blo-bzang Rgya-mtsho), the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, (1617-1682) was the first Dalai Lama to wield effective political power over central Tibet.

The fifth Dalai Lama is known for unifying Tibet under the control of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism, after defeating the rival Kagyu and Jonang sects and the secular ruler, the prince of Shang, in a prolonged civil war. His efforts were successful in part because of aid from Gushi Khan, a powerful Oirat military leader. The Jonang monasteries were either closed or forcibly converted, and that school remained in hiding until the latter part of the twentieth century.

In 1652 the fifth Dalai Lama visited the Manchu emperor, Shunzhi. He was not required to kowtow, and received a seal.

The fifth Dalai lama initiated the construction of the Potala Palace in Lhasa, and moved the centre of government there from Drepung.
The Potala Palace in Lhasa
The Potala Palace in Lhasa

The death of the fifth Dalai Lama in 1680 was kept hidden for fifteen years by his assistant, confidant, and possibly son, Desi Sangay Gyatso (De-srid Sangs-rgyas Rgya-’mtsho). The Dalai Lamas remained Tibet’s titular heads of state until 1959.

During the rule of the Great Fifth, two Jesuit missionaries, the German Johannes Gruber and Belgian Albert Dorville, stayed in Lhasa for two months, October and November, 1661 on their way from Peking to Goa in India.[68] They described the Dalai Lama as a “powerful and compassionate leader” and “a devilish God-the-father who puts to death such as refuse to adore him.” Another Jesuit, Ippolito Desideri, stayed five years in Lhasa (1716-1721) and was the first missionary to master the language. He even produced a few Christian books in Tibetan. Capuchin fathers took over the mission until all missionaries were expelled in 1745.

In the late seventeenth century, Tibet entered into a dispute with Bhutan, which was supported by Ladakh. This resulted in an invasion of Ladakh by Tibet. Kashmiri helped to restore Ladakhi rule, on the condition that a mosque be built in Leh and that the Ladakhi king convert to Islam. The Treaty of Temisgam in 1684 settled the dispute between Tibet and Ladakh, but its independence was severely restricted.

[edit] Khoshud, Dzungars, and Manchu

In the 1630s, Tibet became entangled in the power struggles between the rising Manchu and various Mongol and Oirad factions. Ligden Khan of the Chakhar, retreating from the Manchu, set out to Tibet to destroy the Yellow Hat sect. He died on the way in Koko Nur in 1634 [69]. His vassal Tsogt Taij continued the fight, even having his own son Arslan killed after Arslan changed sides. Tsogt Taij was defeated and killed by Güshi Khan of the Khoshud in 1637, who would in turn become the overlord of Tibet, and act as a “Protector of the Yellow Church”[70]. Güshri helped the fifth Dalai Lama to establish himself as the highest spiritual and political authority in Tibet and destroyed any potential rivals, like the prince of Tsang. The time of the fifth Dalai Lama was, however, also a period of rich cultural development.

The fifth Dalai Lama’s death was kept secret for fifteen years by the regent (Tibetan: desi; Wylie: sde-srid), Sanggye Gyatso. This was apparently done so that the Potala Palace could be finished, and to prevent Tibet’s neighbours taking advantage of an interregnum in the succession of the Dalai Lamas.[71] The sixth Dalai Lama was not enthroned until 1697.

The sixth Dalai Lama enjoyed a lifestyle that included drinking, the company of women, and writing love songs.[72] In 1705, Lobzang Khan of the Khoshud used the sixth Dalai Lama’s escapades as excuse to take control of Tibet. The regent was murdered, and the Dalai Lama sent to Beijing. He died on the way, in Koko Nur, ostensibly from illness. Lobzang Khan appointed a new Dalai Lama, who however was not accepted by the Gelugpa school. Kelzang Gyatso was found in Koko Nur and became a rival candidate.

The Dzungars invaded Tibet in 1717, deposed and killed Lobzang Khan’s pretender to the position of Dalai Lama. This was widely approved. However, they soon began to loot the holy places of Lhasa, which brought a swift response from Emperor Kangxi in 1718; but his military expedition was annihilated by the Dzungars, not far from Lhasa.[73][74]

A second, larger, expedition sent by Emperor Kangxi expelled the Dzungars from Tibet in 1720 and the troops were hailed as liberators. They brought Kelzang Gyatso with them from Kumbum to Lhasa and he was installed as the seventh Dalai Lama in 1721.[75][76]

Following the Qing withdrawal from central Tibet in 1723, there was a period of civil war.

After the rebellion of a Khoshuud Mongol prince near Koko Nur, the Qing made the region of Amdo and Kham into the province of Qinghai in 1724,[77] and incorporated eastern Kham into neighbouring Chinese provinces in 1728.[78] The Qing government sent a resident commissioner (amban) to Lhasa.

“The temporal power [in the mid 1840s] of the Supreme Lama ends at Bathang [see Batang Town]. the frontiers of Tibet, properly so called, were fixed in 1726, on the termination of a great war between the Tibetans and the Chinese. Two days before you arrive at Bathang, you pass, on the top of a mountain, a stone monument, showing what was arranged at that time between the government of Lha-Ssa and that of Peking, on the subject of boundaries. At present, the countries situate east of Bathang are independent of Lha-Ssa in temporal matters. They are governed by a sort of feudal princes, originally appointed by the Chinese Emperor, and still acknowledging his paramount authority. These petty sovereigns are bound to go every third year to Peking, to offer their tribute to the Emperor.”[79]

Spencer Chapman gives a similar, but more detailed, account of this border agreement:

“In 1727, as a result of the Chinese having entered Lhasa, the boundary between China and Tibet was laid down as between the head-waters of the Mekong and Yangtse rivers, and marked by a pillar, a little to the south-west of Batang. Land to the west of this pillar was administered from Lhasa, while the Tibetan chiefs of the tribes to the east came more directly under China. This historical Sino-Tibetan boundary was used until 1910. The states Der-ge, Nyarong, Batang, Litang, and the five Hor States—to name the more important districts—are known collectively in Lhasa as Kham, an indefinite term suitable to the Tibetan Government, who are disconcertingly vague over such details as treaties and boundaries.”[80]

China began posting two high commissioners, or ambans, to Lhasa in 1727. Pro-Chinese historians argue that the ambans’ presence was an expression of Chinese sovereignty, while those favouring Tibetan claims tend to equate the ambans with ambassadors. “The relationship between Tibet and (Qing) China was that of priest and patron and was not based on the subordination of one to the other,” according to the thirteenth Dalai Lama,[81] (The thirteenth Dalai Lama was deposed (1904), reinstated (1908), and deposed (1910) again by the Qing Dynasty government.) [82] Pho-lha-nas, an important Tibetan aristocrat, ruled Tibet with Chinese support in 1728-47. In 1728 the young seventh Dalai Lama was invited to visit Beijing,[83] but Pho-lha-nas only had him moved from Lhasa to Litang to make it more difficult for him to influence the government. After Pho-lha-nas died, his son ruled until he was killed by the ambans in 1750. This provoked riots during which the ambans were killed. A Chinese army entered the country and restored order.

Tibetan factions rebelled in 1750 and killed the ambans. Then, a Manchu Qing army entered and defeated the rebels and installed an administration headed by the Dalai Lama. The number of soldiers in Tibet was kept at about 2,000. The defensive duties were partly helped out by a local force which was reorganized by the resident commissioner, and the Tibetan government continued to manage day-to-day affairs as before. In 1751, the Manchu (and Qing) Emperor Qianlong established the Dalai Lama as both the spiritual leader and political leader of Tibet who lead a government (Kashag) with four Kalöns in it.[84] Under Emperor Qianlong no further attempts were made to integrate Tibet into the empire. Instead, Emperor Qianlong drew on Buddhism to bolster support among the Tibetans. Six thangkas remain portraying the emperor as Manjusri and Tibetan records of the time refer to him by that name.[85]

In 1788, Gurkha forces sent by Bahadur Shah Zafar II, the Regent of Nepal, invaded Tibet, occupying a number of frontier districts. The young Panchen Lama fled to Lhasa and the Manchu Qianlong Emperor sent troops to Lhasa, upon which the Nepalese withdrew agreeing to pay a large annual sum.

In 1791 the Nepalese Gurkhas invaded Tibet a second time, seizing Shigatse and destroyed, plundered, and desecrated the great Tashilhunpo Monastery. The Panchen Lama was forced to flee to Lhasa once again. The Qianlong Emperor then sent an army of 17,000 men to Tibet. In 1793, with the assistance of Tibetan troops, they managed to drive the Nepalese troops to within about 30 km of Kathmandu before the Gurkhas conceded defeat and returned all the treasure they had plundered.[86]

[edit] 18th and 19th centuries

Main article: History of European exploration in Tibet

[edit] Removal of the Regents and establishment of the Kashag

There are two main versions of how this occurred. The Chinese version is that:

In 1751, the Qianlong Emperor (1711-1799; ruled 1737-1796) issued a 13-point decree which abolished the position of regent (desi), put the Tibetan government in the hands of a four-man Kashag, or Council of Ministers, and gave the ambans formal powers. The Dalai Lama moved back to Lhasa to preside (in name) over the new government.[citation needed]

In 1751, at the age of forty-three, Kelzang Gyatso constituted the “Kashag” or council of ministers to administer the Tibetan government and abolished the post of Regent or Desi, as it placed too much power in one man’s hand and the Dalai Lama became the spiritual and political leader of Tibet.[87]

“The ‘king’ or governor of Tibet was no longer appointed by the Chinese after 1750, and the Dalai Lama was tacitly recognized as sovereign of Tibet, with the exception of Kham and Amdo on the one hand and, on the other, Ladakh—which was at first under Moghul suzerainty before being annexed by Kashmir after the Dogra war (1834-42). China henceforth defended Tibet against foreign invasions (notably that of the Gurkhas, 1788-1792), but reserved the right in future to superintend the choice of a new Dalai or Panchen Lama, dictating a set of candidates from whom the final selection was to be made by lot in the presence of the ambans (1792). In addition, the Emperors loaded Lamaism with favours in China and Mongolia where they set up temples and monasteries and issued invitations, often permanently, to great incarnate Lamas of the Geluk-pa order, which had become the established Church.”[88]

In 1788 the Gurkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah invaded Tibet. Unable to defeat the Gurkhas alone, the Tibetans called upon reinforcements from the Chinese Qing Dynasty. The Qing-Tibetan army defeated the Gurkhas.

The Qianlong emperor was disappointed with the results of his 1751 decree and the performance of the ambans. “Tibetan local affairs were left to the willful actions of the Dalai Lama and the shapes [Kashag members],” he said. “The Commissioners were not only unable to take charge, they were also kept uninformed. This reduced the post of the Residential Commissioner in Tibet to name only.”[78] In 1792, the emperor issued a 29-point decree which appeared to tighten Chinese control over Tibet. It strengthened the powers of the ambans, who were in theory put on a par with the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and given authority over financial, diplomatic and trade affairs. It also outlined a new method to select both the Dalai and Panchen Lama by means of a lottery administered by the ambans in Lhasa. In this lottery the names of the competing candidates were written on folded slips of paper which were placed in a golden urn.[89] The tenth, eleventh and twelfth Dalai Lamas were selected by the golden urn method.[90] The ninth, thirteen, and fourteenth Dalai Lamas, however, were selected by the previous incarnation’s entourage, or labrang, with the selection being approved after the fact by Beijing.

The relationship between Tibet and the Manchu emperors was of mutual benefit:

“While they honoured the high lamas of Tibetan Buddhism, the Manchu emperors regarded them as political subordinates. The Tibetans, however, considered such patronage to be an acknowledgement of the exalted status of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. From the Tibetan point of view, the Lama was the spiritual teacher of the patron, and the patron was obliged to offer protection and material support to the Lama. Both parties believed that they could claim the superior position in the relationship; both parties considered themselves the beneficiaries of the arrangement.”[91]

The British forced the Tibetans to withdraw from Nepal. In the 19th century, the power of the Qing government declined. As Chinese soldiers posted to Lhasa began to neglect their military duties, the ambans lost influence. After the invasion of Tibet by General Zorawar Singh General of Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab wars were fought with the Indian Kingdom of Jammu and were concluded with peace treaties at Ladakh in 1841 with Maharaja Gulab Singh.[92] and Nepal in 1856[93] without the involvement of Beijing. According to Chinese source, Nepal was a tributary state to China from 1788 to 1908.[94] Chinese government claimed that in the 1856 treaty, both Nepal and Tibet claimed allegiance to China.[95] The 1856 treaty provided for a Nepalese mission in Lhasa which later allowed Nepal to claim a diplomatic relationship with Tibet in its application for United Nations membership in 1949.[96]

[edit] British invasions of Tibet (1904-1911)

Main article: British expedition to Tibet

Wikisource has original text related to this article:
“Tibet” (1878) is an account of early British attempts to gain influence in Tibet.

The authorities in British India renewed their interest in Tibet in the late 19th century, and a number of Indians entered the country, first as explorers and then as traders. Treaties regarding Tibet were concluded between Britain and China in 1886[5], 1890[6], and 1893[7], but the Tibetan government refused to recognize their legitimacy[citation needed] and continued to bar British envoys from its territory. During “The Great Game”, a period of rivalry between Russia and Britain, the British desired a representative in Lhasa to monitor and offset Russian influence.

[edit] British invasion

In 1904, the British sent an Indian military force under Lieutenant Colonel Francis Younghusband, which, after some fighting, occupied Lhasa. In response, the Chinese foreign ministry asserted that China was sovereign over Tibet, the first clear statement of such a claim.[97]

When the British mission reached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama had already fled to Urga in Mongolia, Younghusband found the option of returning to India empty-handed untenable, so he proceeded to draft a treaty unilaterally, and have it signed in the Potala by the regent, Ganden Tri Rinpoche, and any other Tibetan officials he could gather together as an ad hoc government. The Tibetan ministers whom Younghusband dealt with had apparently, unknown to him, just been appointed to their posts. The regular ministers had been imprisoned for suspected pro-British leanings and it was feared they would be too accommodating to Younghusband.[98]

A treaty was concluded which required Tibet to open its border with British India, to allow British and Indian traders to travel freely, not to impose customs duties on trade with India, a demand from British that Lhasa had to pay 2.5 million rupees as indemnity and not to enter into relations with any foreign power without British approval.[99]

The Anglo-Tibetan treaty was accordingly confirmed by a Sino-British treaty in 1906 by which the “Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.”[100] Moreover, Beijing agreed to pay London 2.5 million rupees which Lhasa was forced to agree upon in the Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1904.[101] In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that in “conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet”[102][103] both nations “engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.”[102]

[edit] The Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of 1913

In early 1913, Agvan Dorzhiev and two other Tibetan representatives signed a treaty in Urga, proclaiming mutual recognition and their independence from China. However, Agvan Dorzhiev’s authority to sign such a treaty has always been – and still is – disputed by some authorities.[vague]

John Snelling, however, says: “Though sometimes doubted, this Tibet-Mongolia Treaty certainly existed. It was signed on 29 December 1912 (OS) [that is, by the Julian Calendar - thus making it 8 January 1913 by the Gregorian Calendar that we use] by Dorzhiev and two Tibetans on behalf of the Dalai Lama, and by two Mongolians for the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu.” He then quotes the full wording of the treaty (in English) from the British Public Records Office: FO [Foreign Office] 371 1609 7144: Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, St. Petersburg, dated 11 February 1913.[104]

Some British authors have, based on remarks of a Tibetan diplomat some years later, even disputed the mere existence of the treaty[105], but scholars of Mongolia generally are very positive it exists. The Mongolian text of the treaty has, for example, been published by the Mongolian Academy of Sciences in 1982.[106]

[edit] Chinese military expelled

On rd May, 1905, William Mesny, retired Brevet General in the Chinese Army wrote:

“The trouble in Tibet is of a serious nature, and is increasing. The Chinese government’s hold on its distant colony or protected state is not very firm, just now, owing to various causes, princially [sic - should read principally] to general bad management and the decline of suzerain power. The Tibetan people have been greiviouly [sic - read grievously] oppressed for many years all the way along the route from Ta-chien-lu to Lhassa, as witnessed personally by ourselves, whilst on a journey from Chêng-tu, via Ta-chien-lu, Li-t’ang and Pa-t’ang to Ah-tun-tzü on the frontiers of Yun-nan in 1877.
It is possible also that the Tibetan Lamas do not want their Soveign [sic - read Sovereign] Pontiff back at Lhassa where he appears to have been acting as the willing tool of meddlesome diplomats and thus involved his country in a disastrous war.”[107]

The Japanese monk and explorer, Ekai Kawaguchi, writing in 1909, described the loss of Chinese control over Tibet following the first Sino-Japanese War with China 1 August 1894–17 April 1895:

“The loss of Chinese prestige in Tibet has been truly extraordinary since the Japano-Chinese War. Previous to that disastrous event, China used to treat Tibet in a high-handed way, while the latter, overawed by the display of force of the Suzerain, tamely submitted. All is now changed, and instead of that subservient attitude Tibet treats China with scorn…. The Tibetans listen to Chinese advice when it is acceptable, but any order that is distasteful to them is entirely disregarded….”

“Tibet may be said to be menaced by three countries—England, Russia and Nepāl, for China is at present a negligible quantity as a factor in determining its future.”[108]

Following a revolution in China, the local Tibetan militia launched a surprise attack on the Chinese garrison stationed in Tibet. Afterwards the Chinese officials in Lhasa were forced to sign the “Three Point Agreement” which provided for the surrender and expulsion of Chinese forces in central Tibet. In early 1913, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa and issued a proclamation distributed throughout Tibet which condemned “The Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship”, and stated that, “We are a small, religious, and independent nation.”[81]

[edit] The Simla Convention of 1914

In 1913-14, conference was held in Simla between Britain, Tibet, and the Republic of China. The British suggested dividing Tibetan-inhabited areas into an Outer and an Inner Tibet (on the model of an earlier agreement between China and Russia over Mongolia). Outer Tibet, approximately the same area as the modern Tibet Autonomous Region, would be autonomous under Chinese suzerainty. In this area, China would refrain from “interference in the administration.” In Inner Tibet, consisting of eastern Kham and Amdo, Lhasa would retain control of religious matters only.[109] In 1908-18, there was a Chinese garrison in Kham and the local princes were subordinate to its commander.

In a session attended by Tibetan representatives, British chief negotiator Henry McMahon drew a line on a map to delineate the Tibet-Indian border. Later Chinese governments claimed this McMahon Line illegitimately transferred a vast amount of territory to India. The disputed territory is called Arunachal Pradesh by India and South Tibet by China. The British had already concluded agreements with local tribal leaders and set up the Northeast Frontier Tract to administer the area 1912. The Simla Convention was initialed by all three delegations, but was immediately rejected by Beijing because of dissatisfaction with the way the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet was drawn. McMahon and the Tibetans then signed the document as a bilateral accord with a note attached denying China any of the rights it specified unless it signed. The British-run Government of India initially rejected McMahon’s bilateral accord as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention.[110][111]

By 1918, Lhasa had regained control of Chamdo and western Kham. A truce set the Yangtze River the border. At this time, the government of Tibet controlled all of Ü-Tsang as well as Kham west of the Yangtze River, roughly the same borders as the Tibet Autonomous Region has today.[citation needed] Eastern Kham was governed by local Tibetan princes of varying allegiances. In Amdo (Qinghai), ethnic Hui and pro-Kuomintang warlord Ma Bufang controlled the Xining area. The rest of the province were under local control.[citation needed]

During the 1920s and 1930s, China was divided by civil war and then distracted by the anti-Japanese war, but never renounced its claim to sovereignty over Tibet, and made occasional attempts to assert it. During the reign of the 13th Dalai Lama, Beijing had no representatives in his territories. However, in 1934, following the Dalai Lama’s death, China sent a “condolence mission” to Lhasa headed by General Huang Musong.[112] Since 1912 Tibet had been de facto independent of Chinese control, but on other occasions it had indicated its willingness to accept subordinate status as a part of China provided that Tibetan internal systems were left untouched and provided China relinquished control over a number of important ethnic Tibetan areas in Kham and Amdo.[113]

In 1938, the British finally published the Simla Convention as a bilateral accord and demanded that the Tawang monastery, located south of the McMahon Line, cease paying taxes to Lhasa. In an attempt to revise history, the relevant volume of C.U. Aitchison’s A Collection of Treaties, which had originally been published with a note stating that no binding agreement had been reached at Simla, was recalled from libraries.[114] It was replaced with a new volume that has a false 1929 publication date and includes Simla together with an editor’s note stating that Tibet and Britain, but not China, accepted the agreement as binding.[8] The 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, which had earlier caused the British to question the validity of Simla, had been renounced by the Russians in 1917 and by the Russians and British jointly in 1921.[115] Tibet, however, altered its position on the McMahon Line in the 1940s. In late 1947, the Tibetan government wrote a note presented to the newly independent Indian Ministry of External Affairs laying claims to Tibetan districts south of the McMahon Line.[116] Furthermore, by refusing to sign the Simla documents, the Chinese Government had escaped according any recognition to the validity of the McMahon Line.[117]

Tibet established a Foreign Office in 1942, and in 1946 it sent congratulatory missions to China and India (related to the end of World War II). The mission to China was given a letter addressed to Chinese President Chiang Kai-sek which states that, “We shall continue to maintain the independence of Tibet as a nation ruled by the successive Dalai Lamas through an authentic religious-political rule.” The mission agreed to attend a Chinese constitutional assembly in Nanjing as observers.[118]

In 1947-49, Lhasa sent a “Trade Mission” led by the Tsepon (Finance Minister) W.D. Shakabpa to India, Hong Kong, Nanjing (then the capital of China), the U.S., and Britain. The visited countries were careful not to express support for the claim that Tibet was independent of China and did not discuss political questions with the mission.[119] These Trade Mission officials entered China via Hong Kong with their newly issued Chinese passports that they applied at the Chinese Consulate in India and stayed in China for three months. Other countries did, however, allow the mission to travel using passports issued by the Tibetan government. The U.S. unofficially received the Trade Mission.

The mission met with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in London in 1948.[120]

[edit] Rule of the Chinese Communist Government

Main article: Invasion of Tibet (1950–1951)

The Chinese Communist government led by Mao Zedong which came to power in October lost little time in asserting its presence in Tibet. In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army entered the Tibetan area of Chamdo, defeating sporadic resistance from the Tibetan army. In 1951, representatives of Tibetan authority, acting without authorisation from the Dalai Lama, participated in negotiations in Beijing with Chinese government. It resulted in a Seventeen Point Agreement which affirms China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later.[121]

The Chinese government at first attempted to reform Tibet’s social or religious system in Ü-Tsang. Eastern Kham， previously Xi Kang province, was incorporated in the province of Sichuan. Western Kham was put under the Chamdo Military Committee. In these areas, land reform was implemented. This involved communist agitators designating “landlords” — sometimes arbitrarily chosen — for public humiliation in “struggle sessions.”[citation needed] “It was only after the Dalai Lama fled his country, in 1959, that China began to collectivize the land and execute landlords, as it “liberated the serfs” in Central Tibet.”[122][123]

The Chinese built highways that reached Lhasa, and which then extended the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders. The traditional Tibetan aristocracy and government remained in place and were subsidized by the Chinese government.[citation needed] During the 1950s, however, Chinese rule grew more oppressive with respect to the lamas.[citation needed]

By the mid-1950s there was unrest in eastern Kham and Amdo, where land reform had been implemented in full. These rebellions eventually spread into western Kham and Ü-Tsang. In some parts of the country Chinese Communists tried to establish rural communes, as was happening in the whole of China.

In 1959, China’s military crackdown on rebels in Kham and Amdo led to the “Lhasa Uprising.” Full-scale resistance spread throughout Tibet. Fearing capture of the Dalai Lama, unarmed Tibetans surrounded his residence, forcing the Dalai Lama to flee with the help of the CIA to India. [124]

The Tibetan resistance movement began with isolated resistance to PRC control in the late 1950s. Initially there was considerable success and with CIA support and aid much of southern Tibet fell into Tibetan hands, but in 1959, after the failed military attempts in Lhasa resistance forces withdrew into Nepal.[clarify] Operations continued from the semi-independent Kingdom of Mustang with a force of 2000 rebels, many of them trained at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, USA[125] In 1969, on the eve of Kissinger’s overtures to China, support was withdrawn and the Nepalese gove